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Income and wage inequality increased rapidly in a number of OECD economies. This report 
surveys the literature on the determinants of wage and income inequality and presents a 
framework for analyzing policy. The focus is on human capital policies, but other policies that 
could also reduce income inequality are considered.  
 
The report concludes that increased income inequality in OECD economies reflects greater 
wage inequality and higher skill premia and that the most likely cause of the rise in skill premia 
is technical change that has increased the demand for skills and education, though changes in 
labor market institutions, such as minimum wage laws and the importance of union 
bargaining, are also likely to have played some role. Although increasing the supply of skills 
may have some beneficial effects, the most useful policies to reduce inequality would be those 
that can close the gap of skills between the top and the bottom of the income distribution, 
such as policies to improve the quality of secondary schooling and to encourage on-the-job 
training. 
 1E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y
Income and wage inequality increased rapidly in a number of OECD economies. These
trends spurred research both on the causes of this increase in inequality and on policies
that could reduce inequality.
This report surveys the literature on the determinants of wage and income inequality
and presents a framework for analyzing policy. The focus is on human capital policies,
but other policies that could also reduce income inequality are considered.
The major conclusions from this survey and framework are as follows:
² Increased income inequality in OECD economies re‡ects greater wage inequality
and higher skill prices (skill premia).
² The most likely cause of the increase in skill premia in the U.S. is technical change
that has increased the demand for skills and education, though changes in labor
market institutions, such as minimum wage laws and the importance of union bar-
gaining, are also likely to have played some role.
² Since many of the technologies that have spread throughout the U.S. economy over
the past 20 years are also a¤ecting many other OECD economies, we may expect
further increases in inequality in these economies, including New Zealand. However,
there has already been a large and rapid increase in inequality in New Zealand, so it
is possible that most of the adjustment to new technologies has already taken place.
² Although greater openness to international trade could also increase inequality, in-
ternational trade per se does not appear to have been a major factor in the recent
widening of the earnings distribution. This suggests that limiting international trade
is unlikely to be an e¤ective policy to reduce inequality.
² Standard economic theory suggests that an increase in the supply of skills will reduce
skill premia. Therefore, increases in the average human capital in the economy could
1reduce inequality. Nevertheless, because technologies adjust to changes in the supply
of skills, the e¤ect of the relative supply of skills on inequality is likely to be small.
Moreover, the e¤ects of policies that increase the supply of skills work only slowly,
so policies that a¤ect average human capital, without changing its distribution, will
have little e¤ect in the near future.
² Overall, human capital policies to reduce inequality must close the gap of skills
between the top and the bottom of the income distribution.
² Although changes in the signal value of education to employers and changes in the
distribution of rents in the labor market may have contributed to the increase in
inequality, these e¤ects appear to have been limited in the U.S. case.
² In the U.S., changes in the types of jobs that …rms create (“good” jobs being replaced
by “bad” jobs) may have been important in shaping the wage distribution, but such
changes are likely to have been due to changes in technology, and still suggest
that narrowing the gap of skills between the top and the bottom of the earnings
distribution should be the top policy priority.
² Higher returns to schooling may be expected to encourage further schooling, and
through this channel, they may reduce inequality in the future. But since the e¤ect
of increases in average human capital on skill prices is limited, this self-correcting
feature of inequality is unlikely to be important. Moreover, there is little evidence
showing a strong e¤ect of returns to schooling on education investments
² Human capital policies would also be useful because there may be underinvestment
in education and training. The main reason for underinvestment in education is
credit market problems. This suggests that increasing the availability of education
loans would be useful.
2² Human capital policies that would be most useful in reducing inequality are those
that increase the skills at the bottom of the skill distribution. These are likely
to be policies that increase the quality of secondary schooling, rather than those
encouraging increased college attendance.
² Among policies that subsidize college education, those that provide direct subsidies
to college are likely to cost a large amount, and subsidize families that would have
sent their children to college even in the absence of the policies. For this reason,
policies that are speci…cally targeted at lower income families, such as means-tested
subsidies or need-based scholarships, are likely to be more e¤ective, less costly, and
…scally less regressive.
² Policies encouraging training could be quite useful in increasing the skills at the
bottom of the earnings distribution. The policies that look most promising for
encouraging training are a combination of subsidies or tax credits for training and
government regulation of existing training programs.
² Training investments are also a¤ected by contracting problems between …rms and
workers and by the organization of the labor market. An important issue to bear in
mind is that when labor markets are noncompetitive, …rms may invest substantial
amounts in the training of their employees. In the presence of such …rm-sponsored
training, wage compression may actually increase training investments.
² Work-…rst policies encouraging the employment of individuals that might otherwise
drop out of the labor market may also be useful.
² Although many economists fear the disincentive e¤ects of policies that encourage
wage compression, such as minimum wages or progressive unemployment bene…ts,
there is little evidence that moderate amounts of wage compression create large
distortions. Moreover, wage compression may encourage …rms to invest in the
3skills of their employees. Therefore, such policies may also be useful in limiting
wage inequality.
² Redistributive taxation could also be highly e¤ective in reducing post-tax income
inequality, but before an increase in redistributive taxation, the e¤ect of high tax
rates on the labor supply and outmigration rates of high earners needs to be studied
further.
42I n t r o d u c t i o n
2.1 Objective
Income and wage inequality (dispersion) increased rapidly in a number of OECD economies,
most notably the Anglo-Saxon countries, the U.S., the UK, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand. In the U.S., for example, in 1980 college graduates earned about 40% more
than high school graduates. Today this number is over 60%. The standard deviation of
weekly earnings was approximately 0.5 in 1980, whereas today this number stands above
0.6. The available evidence suggests that the increase in New Zealand has been even
larger than in the U.S., the U.K. and Australia (see Dixon, 1998, O’Dea, 2000, Borland,
2000).
Although increased wage inequality may re‡ect increased renumeration of skills, the
general consensus among social scientists, economists and policy makers is that inequality
is also socially costly. For this reason, there has been increased interest in ways of reducing
inequality. There are three broad types of policies for combatting inequality.
1. Human capital policies. These policies aim to increase the human capital of the
society as a whole, or of speci…c groups within the society. They will a¤ect inequality,
…rst because they may help in narrowing the skill gap between di¤erent groups, and
secondly because they may reduce the scarcity and therefore the price of skills.
2. Wage compression policies. These policies try to induce or force …rms to narrow the
pay gap between skilled and unskilled workers for a given distribution of skills.
3. Redistributive taxation. This type of policy would leave the wage distribution
largely unchanged, but would equalize the post-tax distribution of income by in-
creasing the tax rate on higher earnings, and reducing the taxes of lower earners.
The general consensus among economists is that the role of wage compression and
redistributive taxation policies in reducing inequality is limited. So a natural starting
5place is a discussion of how human capital policies may a¤ect the distribution of earnings
and what their costs and bene…ts are. I will return to wage compression and redistributive
taxation policies later, since I believe that these policies can be more e¤ective reducing,
or at least limiting, inequality than usually assumed.
The purpose of this report is to investigate the e¤ectiveness and costs and bene…ts of
various human capital policies. There is a large academic literature on wage inequality
and human capital investments that has generated a number of important insights. This
report will review the …ndings of this literature, place them within a simple framework
that can be used for policy analysis, and draw some tentative policy conclusions.
2.2 Outline
An analysis of the e¤ects of human capital policies on inequality needs to start from a
framework that highlights the major determinants of inequality. In Part 3 of the proposal,
I start with the most common framework that links wage inequality to supply and demand
for skills and distribution of skills across individuals. This simple framework highlights a
number of important issues:
1. Wage inequality is determined by the gap of skills across individuals and the price
of skills (the skill premium).
2. Human capital policies can have both direct and indirect e¤ects on inequality. The
direct e¤ect will depend on how human capital policies change the distribution of
skills. For example, if they encourage relatively low skill individuals to acquire more
skills, they will narrow the skills gap. On the other hand, if it is the relatively high
earners who invest more in skills as a result of these human capital policies, they
may increase inequality. Human capital policies will also have an indirect e¤ect
by changing the price of skills in the society. Although there are some important
countervailing e¤ects, this indirect e¤ect, by making skills more abundant in the
6society, is likely to reduce skill premia and hence inequality. These bene…cial e¤ects
may, however, take a long time and have large …nancial costs.
3. Immigration of relatively unskilled workers is likely to increase inequality through
similar direct and indirect channels. New immigrants may be relatively unskilled,
and consequently earn less than most natives. Therefore, greater immigration of
unskilled workers may increase inequality by widening the gap between the top and
the bottom of the earnings distribution. Increased immigration of unskilled workers
may also increase inequality among natives by reducing the relative supply of skills
and increasing skill premia. Conversely, greater immigration of relatively skilled
workers will tend to reduce inequality.
4. Technological changes that have been taking place over the past thirty years make
it likely that the demand for skills will continue to increase in many countries, and
speci…cally in New Zealand, creating another force towards higher inequality both
now and in the future.
5. Increased international trade may also create a force towards greater inequality,
especially if trade with less developed countries increases further. However, this
e¤ect is likely to be relatively small.
Although the simple supply-demand framework of Part 3 is useful in isolating a number
of important factors, it leaves out a range of issues. In Part 4 of the proposal I discuss
these issues. I pay special attention to the following:
1. The signaling role of education and selection: if education is in part a signal to po-
tential employers regarding employees’ unobserved ability, the relationship between
the supply of skills and inequality may be di¤erent. For example, greater fractions
of individuals within a cohort receiving high education may signal to the employers
that those with less education are increasingly lower ability, and hence reduce the
7earnings of low education workers. This may increase the earnings gap between high
and low education workers. The same forces may operate even in the absence of
signaling if workers with di¤erent characteristics, unobserved in the standard sur-
veys, select into education di¤erentially. For example, it may be only those with
very low unobserved skills who do not obtain higher education today, once again
widening the gap between the earnings of those with and without higher education.
Nevertheless, I will argue that there is relatively little evidence that this has been
an important consideration in the U.S., and hence, perhaps unlikely to have been
important in New Zealand.
2. Rent-sharing in the labor market. I discuss how changes in the patterns of rent-
sharing in the labor market could have increased inequality. For example, if jobs that
previously paid high wages, because workers were able to share some of the labor
market rents, managed to reduce wages, a large number of workers would experience
a fall in their real earnings. This change in the distribution of labor market rents
would increase inequality. I argue that although changes in labor market rents are
likely have taken place in the U.S. over the past twenty-…ve years, they are unlikely
to have been the main driving force of the increase in inequality.
3. Good jobs versus bad jobs. I also discuss how changes in the quality composition
of jobs may have contributed to the increase in inequality. I conclude that such
changes in the quality distribution of jobs are likely to have been important. Never-
theless, they do not a¤ect the conclusions regarding what the causes of the increase
in inequality are (though they somewhat a¤ect the welfare implications of these
changes).
Overall, after Parts 3 and 4 of the report, I conclude that the most useful policies to
reduce income inequality would be those that close the skills gap between the top and
bottom of the income distribution.
8In Part 5, I discuss incentives to invest in education and training, with special em-
phasis on possible market failures. The main conclusion of this part of the report is that
credit market problems are likely to lead to underinvestment in education and training.
Although human capital externalities could also lead to underinvestment, these appear
less important in practice.
A number of other factors also shape both the incentives and the e¢ciency of training
investments. I discuss under what circumstances …rms will invest in the training of their
employees, and how contractual problems between …rms and workers will complicate
whether the e¢cient amount of investment, or any investment at all, will take place.
I also show that in the presence of noncompetitive elements in the labor market, wage
compression may actually increase training investments.
In Part 6 of the report, I discuss a variety of policies to reduce inequality. Although
the focus of this part is on human capital policies, I start the discussion with policies that
could reduce inequality without changing the human capital distribution directly. More
speci…cally, I discuss policies encouraging wage compression in the private sector and
redistributive taxation. The conclusions I reach from the literature can be summarized
as follows:
1. Many economists fear the disincentive and disemployment e¤ects of wage compres-
sion policies, such as minimum wages or progressive unemployment bene…ts. I argue
below that these e¤ects may have been exaggerated. This suggests that moderate
wage compression policies may be useful in limiting income inequality. Because
the minimum wage is already relatively high in New Zealand, likely causing some
amount of wage compression, further wage compression policies may be unnecessary.
But in that case this analysis suggests that existing policies that encourage wage
compression should not be dismantled.
2. Similarly, the disincentive e¤ects of redistributive taxation may have also been ex-
9aggerated. Redistributive taxation, in moderation, could be an e¤ective policy to
reduce post-tax income inequality.
3. As noted above, the most e¤ective policies to reduce income inequality are those
that close the skills gap between the top and the bottom of the income distribution.
So human capital policies are of central importance. There are also many reasons
to suspect that there may be underinvestment in human capital, so some amount of
subsidy for human capital investments may be necessary. Yet, governments already
subsidize all three levels of education. It is therefore not clear whether further direct
subsidies are called for.
4. Although many economists and commentators advocate further direct subsidies to
college education, such policies may not be the best option for policymakers. These
policies are often regressive, because they bene…t mostly middle and higher income
families.
5. If the concern is to alleviate credit market problems, education loans may be a
better policy tool. If the objective of human capital policies is to increase college
attendance by lower-income families, on the other hand, the best policy would be
need-based or means-tested subsidies or scholarships. Such policies would be cheaper
and more e¤ective in encouraging college education among lower-income families.
6. An important conclusion of this report is that encouraging college education is un-
likely to narrow the gap between the top and the bottom of the income distribution.
This is because policies encouraging college attendance do not a¤ect the human
capital of workers at the very bottom (e.g. to 10 percentile) of the wage distri-
bution. Therefore, they may close the gap between the middle and the top, but
would not a¤ect the gap between the bottom and the top. To narrow the skills gap
between the top and the bottom, we need policies that encourage higher quality
10secondary education for lower-income families and policies that encourage training
for relatively low-pay workers.
7. Work-…rst type policies that encourage individuals that would otherwise be out of
the labor force to …rst gain employment and policies that support pre-school human
capital accumulation of children from lower-income families by providing day-care
could also be useful, though these are unlikely to be the most e¤ective policies to
reduce overall inequality.
113A S i m p l e F r a m e w o r k
3.1 Components of Income Inequality
A discussion of human capital policies to combat inequality requires a theory of inequality.
In this section I start from the simplest framework. Income inequality among individuals
re‡ects the distribution of employment hours and wages across individuals. For many
purposes, we may care about the household distribution of income, which also depends
on the correlation between the incomes of the two earners in families consisting of two
adults, as well as the fraction of families with two adults.
The evidence from the U.S. indicates that the major source of the increase in in-
come inequality has been the increase in wage inequality. The overall increase in income
inequality is larger than the increase in wage inequality because of two factors:
1. The distribution of hours of work among employed workers has become more un-
equal. In particular, higher earners now work more hours than lower earners (see,
for example, Wang, 1998).
2. The probability that a low skill individual is unemployed or out of the labor force
has also increased substantially, while the employment rates of high skill individuals
has changed much less (e.g., Juhn, Murphy and Topel, 1991).
In addition, there is some evidence that household income inequality may have in-
creased somewhat more than income inequality among individuals (e.g., Levy and Mur-
nane, 1992, for the U.S., O’Dea, 2000, for New Zealand). Although issues related to why
the composition of households has changed are interesting, they are beyond the scope
of this report, so I will focus on determinants of individual income inequality. Moreover,
since the reasons why the distribution of employment and hours has become more unequal
are likely to be related to the increase in wage inequality, this part of the report will focus
on the determinants of wage inequality.
12Finally, in most of the discussion I will focus on the cross-sectional (point-in-time)
distribution of earnings, since we have most information about cross-sectional measures
of inequality, and such measures of inequality are likely to best re‡ect the distribution of
worker productivity (and human capital). Lifetime earnings inequality may behave di¤er-
ently than cross-sectional inequality, for example, because of increased earning mobility.
In an in‡uential paper, Gottschalk and Mo¢tt (1994) point out that in the U.S. there
has been a large increase in earnings instability (or mobility). Nevertheless, their …ndings
also show that despite this greater mobility, lifetime earnings inequality also increased by
a large amount over the same period. So the focus here on cross-sectional inequality as a
measure of overall income inequality is not misleading.
3.2 Determinants of Wage Inequality
While, undoubtedly, many factors a¤ect the distribution of wages, a natural starting
point for an economic analysis is that of supply and demand. In the introduction to his
pioneering study of income distribution, Tinbergen (1975, p. 15) wrote
“...what matters is the di¤erence between qualities available and quali-
ties required by the demand side, that is by the organization of production.”
(italics in the original).
So I start with a competitive framework where wages re‡ect di¤erences in worker
productivities. In this framework, wage inequality will consist of two components:
1. Skill gaps across workers.
2. The prices of skills.
For example, a worker will be paid more than another because he can perform more
advanced tasks or produce di¤erent goods, which re‡ects the skill gap (or his di¤erent
13skills). The exact magnitude of the wage gap will also re‡ect the market prices of these
di¤erent tasks or goods.
I start with a framework that takes skill gaps as given, and discuss the determinants
of skill prices (skill premia). I will later analyze the determinants of skill gaps. At a
fundamental level, skill prices are determined by two factors: the supply of skills and the
demand for skills. The supply of skills is determined by education decisions, the education
system in general, training investments by …rms and workers, and also immigration. The
demand for skills re‡ects a variety of forces, but most notably, technology and trade.
Although the main issues are relatively straightforward, it is helpful to express the
basic relationships using a simple model. In what follows, I consider a relatively stripped
but rich framework, which is normally viewed as a workhorse in the labor economics and
macroeconomics literatures. This framework was informally discussed by Becker (1964),
Tinbergen (1974, 9075), and Welch (1970), among others, and has featured in many recent
papers, including Katz and Murphy (1992), and Acemoglu (1998, 2000).
Consider an economy with two goods and two di¤erent types of workers. For concrete-
ness, let us suppose that these two types of workers are those with college education and
those with high school education (or high and low education workers, or alternatively,
skilled and unskilled workers). One of these goods is produced by low education workers,
while the other requires high education workers. Suppose that the economy consists of l
low and h high education workers workers. Moreover, suppose that both types of workers
di¤er in terms of their e¤ective units of labor. In particular, denote the e¢ciency units of
labor possessed by a low education worker i by ei
l. Similarly the e¢ciency units of skills
supplied by a high education worker j is e
j
h. We can also think of these e¢ciency units as
corresponding to unobserved skills, including “soft” or “people” skills, which according to
a number of economists including Breshnahan et al. (1999), have recently become more
important. Also denote the total supply of e¢ciency units of low education labor by L
and the total supply of e¢ciency units of high education workers by H. I will refer to
14H=L as the relative supply of skills in the economy.
Next assume that the production of the two goods are equal to:
Yl = AlL
Yh = AhH
In this equation, Al is the productivity of low education workers in the production of the
labor-intensive good, while Ah is the productivity of high education workers in the pro-
duction of skill-intensive good. The parameters Al and Ah are determined by technology.
To make further progress we need to specify how society trades o¤ the two goods,
and whether there is international trade. Let us start with no international trade, so
that aggregate consumption is equal to aggregate production for both goods. Let us
also suppose that the utility of the consumers in this society takes the following constant





where Cl is the consumption of the labor-intensive good and Ch to the consumption of the
skill-intensive good, and ½ · 1. The elasticity of substitution in consumption between the
two goods is ¾ ´
1
1¡½. When this elasticity is high, the two goods are close substitutes,
whereas when this elasticity is low, consumers need a balanced composition of the two
goods. For example when ¾ ! 0, we have a …xed-proportions utility function where
consumers need to consume the two goods in …xed proportions. The importance of the
parameter ¾ for us is that it will also turn out to be the elasticity of substitution between
high education (skilled) and low education (unskilled) workers. The value of the elasticity
of substitution will play a crucial role in thinking about the implications of technical
change and changes in the supply of skills.
15Market clearing and consumer maximization imply that the relative prices of the two








This is the familiar relative demand equation. A greater supply of the skill-intensive
good relative to the supply of the labor-intensive good reduces the relative price of the
skill-intensive good, ph=pl. In this case, because of the absence of international trade, the
s u p p l yo fs k i l l - i n t e n s i v eg o o d si se q u a lt oAhH, while the supply of the labor-intensive
good is AlL. When the elasticity of substitution, ¾, is low, the e¤ect of relative supply on
the relative price is strong, and a given increase in relative supply translates into a larger
fall in the relative price of skill-intensive goods
Let us next turn to the labor market, and assume that it is competitive. Although
rent-sharing between …rms and workers is likely to be an important characteristic of many
labor markets, the competitive equilibrium is a useful benchmark from which to start.
Since in a competitive market all workers are paid the value of their marginal product, we
immediately obtain that the wage for labor services is wL = pLAL, whereas the wage for
a unit of human capital is wH = pHAH. Intuitively, these wages are equal to the physical
marginal product multiplied by the price of the goods produced. These equations imply













We are now in a position to discuss the distribution of wages in this hypothetical
economy. Suppose that an average low education worker has eL units of labor, while
an average high education worker has eH units of skills. Then, a natural measure of
inequality, earnings of the average skilled worker relative to the earnings of the average

















We can now see the two forces that determine earnings inequality. The …rst is the skill gap
eH=eL, that is, the relative skills of the two groups of workers. The second determinant of
earnings inequality is the price of skills (the skill premium), !. When the skill premium
is larger, a given skill gap will translate into greater earnings inequality.
To make further progress, we need to have a sense of how these various factors a¤ect
earnings inequality quantitatively, and also discuss in more detail the determinants of the


















This equation highlights that in our setup with no international trade, the skill premium
is a function of technology, the …rst term, and the relative supply of skills, the second.
This equation can also be thought as the relative demand for skills: it gives the skill
premium that is consistent with market clearing. Naturally, the relative demand for skills








Figure 1 shows this relative demand curve diagrammatically. It draws the relative demand
for skills as captured by equation (3) against the relative supply of skills, H=L,w h i c hi s
taken to be given for the purposes of this exercise. An increase in the relative supply,
from H=L to H0=L0, moves the equilibrium point along the downward sloping relative
demand curve, and depresses the skill premium from ! to !0. Intuitively, an increase in
the relative supply of skills increases the production of skill-intensive goods relative to
17the production of labor-intensive goods. Given the absence of international trade, this
translates into an increase in the relative consumption of skill-intensive goods. However,
consumers view the two goods as complementary—they will only consume more of the
skill-intensive good if its relative price falls. Therefore, the increase in the relative supply
of skills leads to a reduction in the relative price of skill-intensive goods. This change in
relative prices a¤ects the relative value of marginal products of the two types of workers,
and reduces the relative wages of high education workers.
The framework here abstracts from substitution of skilled and unskilled workers in
the production process, so the e¤ect of the increase in the relative supply of skills on
relative wages works through changes in product prices (changes in the substitution in
consumption). This is only a simpli…cation. Similar results would apply if skilled and
unskilled workers also worked together in the production of the same goods. Then an
increase in the relative supply of skills would lead to the substitution of skilled workers for
tasks previously performed by the unskilled, and similarly reduce their marginal product.
The slope of the relative demand curve, or the quantitative e¤ect of a change in the
supply of skills on the skill premium, depends on the elasticity of substitution ¾.S o i t
is crucial to know how large this elasticity is likely to be. One way of estimating this
elasticity of substitution is to run a regression of the form (3). Katz and Murphy (1992)
estimate a similar equation to (3) using aggregate U.S. data between 1963-1987. They
take the skill premium to be the college premium in the U.S. labor market and de…ne
skilled workers as those with college and the unskilled workers as those with high school
degree.1 Plausibly, over a period of 25 years, technology will change as well, a¤ecting the
skill premium. To deal with the change in the demand for skills coming from technology
or perhaps international trade, they also include a linear time trend in the equation. They
1More speci…cally, they use the relative supply of college equivalent workers. This is de…ned as college
graduates+0.29£some college-0.05£high school dropouts divided by high school graduates+0.69£some
college+0.93£high school dropouts.
18…nd






This approach does fairly well in capturing the salient features of the changes in the college
premium between 1963 and 1987. For example, the predicted values from this regression
are quite close to the realizations of the college premium. This suggests that the simple
model above in terms of substitution between higher education and low education workers
is a useful framework for thinking about the determination of college premia, or more
generally, skill premia. More important for our purposes here, the estimates imply that
the elasticity of substitution between college graduate workers and noncollege workers is
about ¾ =1 =0:71 ¼ 1:4. More recently, Murphy, Riddle and Romer (1998) have argued
this for Canada and the U.S., and Card and Lemieux (1999) for the U.S., Canada and
the U.K. and found similar elasticities.
There is also more microlevel evidence corroborating this …nding. Freeman (1986)
surveys a number of papers, and concludes that there is widespread consensus that the
elasticity of substitution between high and low education workers is between ¾ =1and
2.
An interesting study from a quasi-natural experiment also supports this range of esti-
mates. Angrist (1995) looks at the response of the returns to schooling to the increase in
the supply of skills in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the 1980s resulting from an
institutional change. There was a very large increase in the supply of skilled Palestinian
labor as there opened Palestinian institutions of higher education, which were totally
absent before 1972. Angrist shows that premia to college graduate workers (relative to
high school graduates) that were as high as 40 percent quickly fell to less than 20 per-
cent. The extent of substitution was also clear. First, many college graduate workers
could not …nd employment in skilled jobs. Angrist (1995) shows a sharp increase in the
unemployment rate of college graduates, and Schi¤ and Yaari (1989) report that only one
in eight Palestinian graduates could …nd work in his profession, with the rest working
19as unskilled laborers, mainly in the construction industry. Second, the premia for tasks
usually performed by more educated workers fell sharply. Between 1984 and 1987, the
premium for administrative and managerial jobs (relative to manual laborers) fell from
.32 to .12, while the premium for clerical workers fell from .02 to -.08 (see Angrist, 1995,
for details).
3.3 Application: The E¤ect of Relative Supply of Skills on Skill
Premia and Implications of Immigration
From this discussion we can conclude that an increase in the relative supply of skills is
likely to reduce the skill premium, and for a given distribution of skills within the society,
this is likely to reduce inequality. The most natural reason for an increase in the supply of
skills is increased education or other forms of investment in human capital. This highlights
that policies that encourage human capital accumulation may have the e¤ect of reducing
inequality through their e¤ect on skill premia. They may also have a direct e¤ect on
inequality because they are changing the distribution of human capital in the society.
Conversely, a decline in the relative supply of skills will tend to increase the skill
premium and inequality. There are two reasons why the relative supply of skills may
decline:
1 .I m m i g r a t i o no fl e s ss k i l l e dw o r k e r s . W h e nag r e a t e rn u m b e ro fu n s k i l l e dw o r k e r s
immigrate to a country, this will make skilled workers more scarce, and increase the
skill premium. Therefore, increased immigration may increase inequality through
two channels. First, with increased immigration, there could be more low skill work-
ers, thus increasing the skill gap between the top and the bottom of the distribution.
Second, increased immigration of unskilled workers may raise inequality even among
natives by increasing the skill premium.
2. Changes in the education system may imply that high education workers have less
skill now than before, because they they may have lower ability, or the education
20system may be teaching them less. In terms of the simple framework above, this
would amount to a reduction in eH, and therefore, to a reduction in the relative
supply of skills, H=L.
I discuss below reasons why there may be forces counteracting the e¤ect of the relative
supply of skills on inequality. But for now, it is useful to calculate how large the e¤ect of an
increase in the supply of skills on skill premia can be in the absence of these counteracting
e¤ects. To do this, consider a hypothetical economy in which workers are in the labor
force for 50 years, there is no population growth, and a quarter of these workers are
college graduates (high education). Also for concreteness, suppose that eH = eL =1(this
is simply a normalization, since Ah=Al is not speci…ed). Then the steady-state relative
supply of skills is H=L =1 =3.
Imagine we now double the capacity of the university system. So once the system has
adjusted, H=L will rise to 1. However, this adjustment will take a very long time. For
example, 10 years after the change, H=L will have only risen to 0:42, because the ‡ow of
new workers is relatively small compared to the stock of workers (with a 50 year working
life and no net population growth, the ‡ow of new workers is equal to 1/50th of the stock
of workers in the labor market at a given point in time). Now using the above elasticity
estimates, we can calculate the implied change in skill premia resulting from these changes
in supplies.
In the long-run, the relative supply will have tripled as a result of the doubling of the
capacity of the university system. Taking ¾ =1 :4 as a baseline estimate of the elasticity
of substitution, this implies that the skill premium will fall by over 50 percent in the long
run. However, ten years after the doubling of the capacity of the university system, the
e¤ect will still be relatively limited. The same parameters imply that in this case the skill
premium will have fallen by 16 percent. The conclusion is that although in the long run
a large increase in the supply of skills will have a substantial e¤ect on the skill premium
and hence inequality, these e¤ects may take quite a long time to operate.
21A similar calculation applies to the ‡ow of unskilled immigrants into the economy,
and suggests that they are unlikely to have had a major e¤ect on skill premia. This
conclusion that the e¤ect of in‡ows of migrants into the economy will have only a limited
e¤ect on skill premia and the wages of natives is also supported by research on the e¤ects
of immigrant ‡ows in to the U.S. and other advanced economies. Possibly the most famous
paper in this literature is that by Card (1990) on the e¤ect of the Mariel boat lift to Miami
in 1980, which brought a large number of relatively unskilled Cubans to the Miami labor
market. The increase was quantitatively very large, as Miami’s population increased by
over 7 percent. However, Card found that this had little e¤ect on the wages, employment
and unemployment rates for unskilled whites and blacks in Miami. A similar study is also
conducted by Hunt (1992) where she examines the e¤ect of the repatriation to France of
individuals of European origin after Algerian Independence in 1962. Similarly, she …nds
small e¤ects on natives. More recently, Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) investigated the
contribution of increased immigration in the U.S. labor market on the decline in the wages
of low skill workers during the 1980s. Although they conclude that increased immigration
had some e¤ect, this e¤ect is still relatively small. I therefore conclude that increased
immigration of unskilled workers is unlikely to be the main force leading to inequality.
In the New Zealand case, the average skill level of migrants appears to be greater
than the native population. This suggests that immigration may be a force towards less
inequality. Nevertheless, the same arguments suggest that the role of immigration in
shaping the wage structure will be limited.
3.4 Technology and Wage Inequality
Another crucial determinant of wage and income inequality is technology. A large lit-
erature has emphasized the role of skill-biased technical change in explaining the rise in
inequality in the U.S. and the UK (see Katz and Autor, 1999, or Acemoglu, 2000, for a
survey). In our above framework, equation (3) shows that the skill premium depends on
22Ah=Al, which can be interpreted as the productivity of high education workers relative
to the productivity of low education workers. How changes in this relative productivity
translate into changes in skill premium depends on the elasticity of substitution.
It is straightforward to see that, as long as the elasticity of substitution is greater than




That is, improvements in the relative productivity of high education workers increase the
skill premium. In terms of Figure 1, an increase in Ah=Al shifts the relative demand
curve out and increases the skill premium for a given supply of skills. Consequently, for
a given distribution of skills in the society, wage and income inequality will increase as
a result of such a change. For natural reasons, we refer to an increase in Ah=Al as skill-
biased technical change—it is a change in technology that bene…ts skilled/highly educated
workers more than unskilled/less educated workers.
It is important to observe that an increase in the productivity of skilled workers may
not always increase wage inequality. If the elasticity of substitution is less than 1, i.e.,
if ¾<1, an improvement in the productivity of skilled workers, Ah,r e l a t i v et ot h e
productivity of unskilled workers, Al, shifts the relative demand curve in and reduces the
skill premium. This case appears paradoxical at …rst, but is, in fact, quite intuitive.
Consider, for example, the case of …xed proportions utility function. In this case, when
Ah increases and high education workers become more productive, the demand for low
education workers, who are necessary to produce the labor-intensive good which is now
in greater demand, increases. In some sense, in this case, the increase in Ah is creating an
“excess supply” of skilled workers given the number of unskilled workers. This increases
the unskilled wage relative to the skilled wage. Nevertheless, the case of ¾<1 appears
of limited empirical importance, since most of the estimates of elasticity of substitution
are greater than 1 as discussed above.
23Are changes in technology important in accounting for the increase in inequality?
There is a large literature on this topic, and considerable disagreement. Nevertheless,
there seems to be little doubt that over the past 50 years, or even over the past hundred
years, many technological improvements have been skill-biased. Consider Figure 2 which
plots a measure of the supply of college skills between 1949 and 1995.2 It also plots returns
to college. It shows that there has been a remarkable increase in the supply of skills in
the U.S. economy over the past sixty years. In 1939, just over 6 percent of American
workers were college graduates. By 1996 this number had increased to over 28 percent.
In 1939, almost 68 percent of all workers did not have a high school degree. In 1996, this
number had fallen to less than 10 percent (see, for example, Autor, Katz and Krueger,
1998, Table 1). The relative supply of skills plotted in Figure 2 gives a sense of these
changes. However, there has been no tendency for the returns to college to fall in the
face of this large increase in supply—on the contrary, there is an increase in the college
premium over this time period. If the relative demand for skills, and therefore Ah=Al,
were stable over this period, we would expect a large increase in the relative supply to
substantially reduce the skill premium (the college return). The fact that this hasn’t
happened is the strongest piece of evidence in favor of a secular increase in the demand
for skills. With half of this picture, Welch (1970, p. 36) reached the same conclusion 30
years ago, and argued:
“With the phenomenal rise in average education, why have rates of return
failed to decline?...
It is obvious that changes have occurred to prevent the decline in returns
to acquiring education that would normally accompany a rise in average edu-
cational level. Presumably, these changes have resulted in growth in demand
2These measures of relative supplies are constructed along the lines of Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998),
as the ratio of college equivalents (those with college plus+0.5£those with some college) to noncollege
equivalents (those with high school or less +0.5£those with some college). It is important to include
workers with some college and those with less than high school, since they also perform similar tasks to
college and high school workers, and therefore a¤ect the relative supply of skills to the society.
24for ... education... su¢cient to absorb the increased supply with constant or
rising returns.”
The developments in the thirty years since then have only strengthened this conclusion.
The regression from Katz and Murphy (1992) also supports this view. There is a highly
signi…cant time trend term in the regression, indicating that for a given relative supply
of skills, the skill premium will be increasing over time. This time trend is therefore
capturing the secular increase in the demand for skills. Most economists view these long-
term changes in the demand for skills to be due to technology
How large are the changes in technology required to explain the patterns observed in
the U.S. labor market? Some back-of-the-envelope calculations provide a sense of the rise
in Ah=Al implied by the changes in the structure of wages and employment in the U.S..
If we assume a speci…c value for the elasticity of substitution, ¾, we can translate these









where SH is the share of high education workers in the wage bill, which we can obtain
from census data. In Table 1, I calculate the implied Ah=Al values for ¾ =1 :4 and
for ¾ =2using workers with some college, college graduates, and college equivalents
de…nitions of Autor et al. In all cases, there is a very large implied increase in Ah=Al
and (Ah=Al)
(¾¡1)=¾ (see Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998, for more a detailed analysis
that controls for potential composition e¤ects). For example, the numbers indicate
that, assuming an elasticity of substitution of 1:4, the relative productivity of college
graduates, Ah=Al, was approximately 0:030 in 1960, increased to 0:069 in 1970, and to
0:157 in 1980. Between 1980 and 1990, it increased by a factor of almost three to reach
0:470. As equation (3) shows, changes in the demand index D =( Ah=Al)
¾¡1
¾ may be more
informative than changes in Ah=Al, so Table 1 also gives the evolution of D.
25An important feature that emerges from Table 1 is that while technical change appears
to have been skill-biased throughout the postwar era, the pace of skill-biased change seems
to have accelerated after 1970s. Although there is an academic debate regarding whether
there has in fact been such an acceleration, many economists now believe that the speed
of skill-biased technical change has been somewhat faster over the past twenty-…ve years
(see, among others, Krueger (1993), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), and Autor,
Katz and Krueger (1998) for evidence that the rapid spread of computers has increased
the demand for skills. See Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000), Galor and
Tsiddon (1997), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000),
Violante (1999), Rubinstein and Tsiddon (1999), Aghion, Howitt and Violante (1999), and
Gould, Moav and Weinberg (1999). See Acemoglu (2000) for a summary of the evidence
for and against acceleration and an evaluation).
What are the implications for New Zealand? It is reasonable to presume that many of
the technologies used in New Zealand have common characteristics with technologies being
used in the U.S., or even many of these technologies may have been originally developed in
the U.S. (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). Therefore, patterns in the U.S. labor market
are indicative of what has been happening in many OECD economies in general, and in
New Zealand, in particular. A number of papers present evidence supporting this view.
Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and Machin and Van Rennan (1998) present evidence
that skill-upgrading has happened in the same industries in many OECD economies,
suggesting that they have been a¤ected by similar technological changes. Berman and
Machin (2000), on the other hand, present evidence documenting the same pattern for
middle-income countries. In all of these cases, there also seems to be a delay in the spread
of skill-biased technical change from the U.S. to other countries. This suggests that
over the next 20 years, technological change will be highly skill-biased in New Zealand.
Therefore, without measures combating inequality, we may expect to see even higher levels
of inequality in the years to come.
263.5 A Caveat: The Relationship Between Relative Supply of
Skills and Technology
The discussion so far has treated technology as exogenous. The recent endogenous growth
literature has placed considerable emphasis on the endogeneity of technology. In Acemoglu
(1998, 1999), I argued that the skill bias of technology is also endogenous, and depends
on the availability of skilled workers.
The argument in Acemoglu (1998) is that when skill-biased techniques are more prof-
itable, …rms will have greater incentives to develop and adopt such techniques. A key
determinant of the pro…tability of new technologies is their market size; machines that
c a nb es o l di ng r e a t e rn u m b e r sw i l lb em o r ep r o … t a b l e . S c h m o o k l e r( 1 9 6 6 ) ,i nh i sp i -
oneering study Invention and Economic Growth, placed great emphasis on market size.
He argued (p. 206) “invention is largely an economic activity which, like other economic
activities, is pursued for gain;... expected gain varies with expected sales of goods embody-
ing the invention.” Therefore, this perspective implies that machines complementary
to skilled workers will be more pro…table to develop when there are more skilled workers
to use them. As a result, a large increase in the supply of skills may not only move the
economy along a relative demand curve for skills as in Figure 1, but would also shift this
relative demand curve out through its e¤ect on technology.
The main argument in Acemoglu (1998) works through the creation of new technolo-
gies, and it may be conjectured that the relevance of this argument for New Zealand is
limited, since New Zealand would be using mostly technologies already developed in the
U.S. or in Europe. Nevertheless, the same argument applies not only to the invention
of new technologies, but to the adoption decisions. If adapting existing technologies to
the labor market or consumer demand in New Zealand is costly, …rms will tend to adapt
technologies that are more pro…table faster. With a similar reasoning, technologies that
have greater market sizes, i.e., there are more workers to use them, will be more prof-
itable. Therefore, an increase in the supply of educated and skilled workers will increase
27the pro…tability of adapting and marketing more skill-biased technologies, increasing the
degree of skill bias of new technologies
The argument in Acemoglu (1999) is related. In that paper, it is not the technology
frontier that changes as a result of an increase in the supply of skills, but how …rms use
the available technology. In particular, when there are more skilled workers, …rms …nd it
more pro…table to invest in high skilled jobs and try to …nd workers suitable for these jobs.
In contrast, when skilled workers are more scarce, …rms may create jobs that both skilled
and unskilled workers could …ll. Therefore, an increase in the supply of skills may take the
economy from a “pooling equilibrium,” where there are high-wage jobs both for skilled
an unskilled workers, to a “separating equilibrium” in which there are only high-quality
jobs only for skilled workers. I will return to this topic in the next part of the report
when I discuss how the quality composition of jobs (good vs. bad jobs) may in‡uence the
distribution of income.
For now, the relevant conclusion is that when technology or the organization of jobs
is endogenous, the behavior of the economy may not simply correspond to a move along
a well-de…ned downward sloping relative demand curve for skills. Figure 3 draws a case
to illustrate this diagramatically. Because of changes in technologies, the relative demand
curve shifts to the right, and as a result, the e¤ect of an increase in the relative supply
of skills on skill premia is limited. Essentially, the changes in the supply of skills is
creating, at least in part, its own demand: when there are more skilled workers, …rms
will eventually demand more skilled workers. As a result, the e¤ect of the increase in
the relative supply of skills on skill premia will be muted. These considerations raise
important caveats about policies that try to combat inequality simply by a¤ecting the
skill premium through changes in the supply of skills.
283.6 International Trade and Inequality
The discussion so far treated the country in question as a closed economy. Many economists
and commentators have argued that increased international trade may have been an im-
portant factor in the increase in inequality. The underlying reasoning is one of standard
factor proportions theory: if New Zealand starts trading with countries that are more
scarce in skills than New Zealand, it would be exporting skill-intensive goods and import-
ing labor-intensive goods. This will act in e¤ect like a decrease in the relative supply of
skills, and increase inequality. In the New Zealand case, much of the trade is with other
OECD economies, so there is little di¤erence in terms of skill abundance. This suggests
that international trade is unlikely to have played a major role in the rise in inequality.
In any case, most evidence suggests that the e¤ect of increased trade with LDCs on U.S.
inequality has been limited as well.
To discuss these e¤ects further using our framework, suppose that instead of consuming
all of its production of the skill-intensive and the labor-intensive goods, our hypothetical
economy now exports a fraction Áh of its skill-intensive production, and imports labor-
intensive goods, of an amount equal to Ál fraction of its domestic production. Then, the



























An increase in international trade corresponds to an increase in Áh and Ál. This has an
unambiguous e¤ect on the skill premium, because it acts as an e¤ective decrease in the
supply of skills in the society.
Is the increase in international trade likely to be an important contributor to increase
inequality? And the related question: can limiting the international trade be an e¤ective
29tool to reduce inequality? In theory, the answer to both of these questions could be yes.
Since New Zealand is more abundant in skilled and educated workers than many of its
trading partners, a large increase in trade openness could have a substantial e¤ect on the
skill premium. The evidence from the U.S., however, suggests that the answers are no.
Despite claims by many economists and commentators that trade has been an im-
portant contributor to inequality, much evidence suggests that these e¤ects are rather
limited, and consequently, limiting trade is unlikely to reduce income inequality substan-
tially. Moreover, given that international trade enables an economy like New Zealand to
exploit its comparative advantages, the costs of limiting international trade are likely to
be substantial.
I now summarize the evidence from the U.S. labor market. First, as equation (6)
shows, the e¤ect of international trade works through a unique intervening mechanism:
more trade with countries that are more scarce in skills increases the relative price of
skill-intensive goods, ph=pl, and a¤ects the skill premium via this channel. In fact, in this
simple framework, the percentage increase in the skill premium is directly proportional
to the percentage increase in the relative price of skill-intensive goods. Perhaps the
most damaging piece of evidence for the trade hypothesis is that most studies suggest
the relative price of skill intensive goods did not increase over the period of increasing
inequality. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) found that during the 1980s the relative price
of skill-intensive goods actually fell. Sachs and Shatz (1994) found no major change or
a slight decline. A more recent paper by Krueger (1997) criticized the methods and
data used by these studies, and found an increase in the relative price of skill intensive
goods. Nevertheless, the increase in these prices is relatively small, so would not be able
to account for the large increase in the skill premium experienced in the U.S. economy
(recall that the change in the relative price of skill intensive goods needs to be of the same
order of magnitude as the change in the skill premium).
Second, with trade as the driving force, wages of skilled workers should increase be-
30cause greater than production of skill-intensive goods is drawing workers away from other
sectors. In contrast, as documented by Murphy and Welch (1993), Berman, Bound and
Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), all sectors, even those producing
less skilled goods, increased their demands for more educated workers. This pattern is
not consistent with trade being the main driving force of the increase in the demand for
skilled workers.3
Third, a direct implication of the trade view is that, as shown above, while demand
for skills and inequality increase in the U.S., the converse should happen in the less skill
abundant countries that have started trading with the more skill abundant U.S. economy.
The evidence, however, suggests that more of the less developed countries that have
started trading with the U.S. experienced rising inequality after opening to international
trade (see Robbins, 1995). Although the increase in inequality in a number of cases
may have been due to concurrent political and economic reforms, the preponderance of
evidence is not favorable to this basic implication of the trade hypothesis.
Finally, a number of economists have pointed out that U.S. trade with the less de-
veloped countries is not important enough to have a major impact on the U.S. product
market prices and consequently on wages. Krugman (1995) illustrates this point by un-
dertaking a calibration of a simple North-South model. Katz and Murphy (1992) and
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) emphasize the same point by showing that the con-
tent of unskilled labor embedded in the U.S. imports is very small relative to the changes
in the supply of skills taking place during this period.4
In view of this evidence from the U.S., I tentatively conclude that international trade
is not the major reason for the increase in inequality, and therefore, limiting international
trade is unlikely to be an e¤ective way of reducing inequality.
3Increased outsourcing associated with international trade makes this fact harder to interpret (see
Feenstra and Hanson, 1999).
4This is probably the weakest criticism against the trade view, and many studies have pointed out
how international trade could have a larger e¤ect on U.S. labor market prices in the presence of labor
market rents. I discuss this below in Part 4 of the report.
313.7 Within Group Inequality
The framework developed so far is most directly applicable to what labor economists refer
to as between-group inequality. Between-group inequality refers to the wage gap between
workers with di¤erent characteristics, such as high and low education workers. The evi-
dence from the U.S. suggests that much of the increase in overall inequality is accounted
for by increases in within-group inequality, that is, increases in inequality among workers
with similar characteristics.
Nevertheless, the framework here can also be used to think about within-group in-
equality, because the characteristics of workers we observe, such as education, age and
sex, are only imperfect measures of their true skills. To illustrate this, take two workers
with high education, but assume that they have di¤erent amounts of skills, for example,
eH and e0
H, because of di¤erent amounts of motivation or because they have attended dif-
ferent schools with di¤erent instructions. Neither of these di¤erences would be observed
in typical data sets. Within-group inequality therefore re‡ects the renumeration to these
unobserved skills.
Now imagine that because of technical change, or some other reason, the skill premium,
!, increases. This change will not only cause a rise in between-group inequality, but will
also increase the earnings gap between the two workers. Therefore, in this framework, the
same forces that cause between-group inequality will also cause within-group inequality.
This framework is therefore a convenient starting place for a discussion of within-group
inequality as well. Nevertheless, the U.S. evidence shows that understanding within-group
indequality is often harder. For example, while between-group inequality fell during the
1970s in the U.S., within-group inequality appears to have increased (Juhn, Murphy and
Pierce, 1993, Katz and Autor, 1999). This suggests that a more appropriate model for
analyzing changes in the distribution of wages is one that allows for di¤erent types of skills,
with di¤erent renumerations. Although this type of model is interesting, it is beyond the
scope of this report, and for the purposes of understanding the determinants of the rise
32in inequality, its implications are not very di¤erent from the simple framework outlined
here (see Acemoglu, 2000).
3.8 Concluding Comments
This section has outlined the standard framework for analyzing inequality. This frame-
work is useful as it clearly distinguishes between the two crucial determinants of wage
inequality: the gap of skills across workers and the price of skills. In turn, it also links
the price of skills to relative supply of skills, technology and trade. In addition to making
theoretical predictions, this framework also enables a quantitative assessment of some of
these e¤ects.
My conclusions from the literature in general, and the discussion above, can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. Skill-biased technical change is likely to have been the major factor in the increase
in wage inequality.
2. Changes in the relative supply of skills, due to increased education of the workforce
or changes in immigration, can change skill prices. However, these e¤ects take a long
time to operate because the ‡ow of new workers into the labor force is relatively
small compared to the stock of workers. Moreover, when technology choices and
development of new production methods are endogenous, changes in the relative
supply of skills can have countervailing e¤ects, substantially weakening the overall
impact of the relative supply of skills on the price of skills.
3. International trade is also a crucial determinant of skill prices, and therefore income
inequality. Nevertheless, the evidence from the U.S. shows that the increase in
international trade has not been the most major factor contributing to the increase
in inequality.
33Therefore the overall conclusion from this framework is that the most e¤ective way of
combating inequality may be to change the distribution of skills within the society.
344 Other Important Determinants of Inequality
The previous part of the report outlined a standard framework based on competitive
labor markets for thinking about the distribution of wages. Real world labor markets
have many non-competitive elements, including imperfect information and rent-sharing.
The presence of such elements often a¤ects how wages are determined, and therefore how
the relative supply of skills, skill gaps and technology determine the distribution of wages.
In this part of the report, I discuss three important considerations:
1. Because of imperfect information, education may act as a signal. As well as the sig-
naling role of education, I will discuss how selection into obtaining di¤erent amounts
of education may a¤ect the distribution of wages.
2. Unions often bargain on behalf of workers, and the decline in the bargaining power
of unions, due to deunionization and other factors, may have reduced wages, and
a¤ected the distribution of wages between di¤erent types of workers.
3. There is an increasing sense that the composition of jobs, in particular the fraction
of high-quality versus low-quality (good vs. bad jobs) has changed, and this has
had a major e¤ect on the distribution of income.
In this part of the report I review the literature related to these topics. I will conclude
that although some of these factors may have been important, they do not a¤ect the basic
conclusions reached at the end of the previous part, and therefore call for policies similar
to those emphasized in that part.
4.1 Education As a Signal and Selection
The above framework was …rmly grounded in the human capital tradition of Becker (1964).
It therefore emphasized the role of education in increasing human capital and productivity.
A well known alternative view emphasizes that education acts as a signal (see Spence,
351974). For example, many in the business world argue that the degree of master of
business administration (MBA) is as much a signal of ability and motivation as a real
contributor to human capital.
To illustrate the basic notion suppose that education has no productivity enhancing
role, but workers di¤er in their underlying ability,5 and ability increases productivity.
Suppose also that there are two levels of education, high (e.g. college) and low (e.g.
high school). The crucial assumption of all signaling models is that the cost of acquiring
education is lower for high ability workers. This is motivated by arguing that high ability
workers are not only more productive in jobs, but also more e¤ective at learning, and
completing the requirements for education.
In this hypothetical world, we can have a situation in which relatively high ability
workers obtain education in order to signal that they are high ability. If these signals are
credible, then employers will pay higher wages to workers with education, anticipating
that these workers will be more productive because of their higher ability. Lower ability
workers naturally would like to mimic this behavior, but because their costs of acquiring
education are higher, they may not …nd this pro…table.
Now imagine an increase in education, for example because the cost of education
has declined. It will naturally be the workers with higher ability, among those who had
previously not obtained high education, who now choose to acquire education. As a
result, the average ability of those without education will decline. An implication of this
reasoning is that as the fraction of those obtaining high education in successive cohorts
increases over time, employers may start preceiving those without education as very low
ability workers. This will in turn reduce the wages they’re willing to pay to these workers,
and contribute to the increase in inequality.
A related story emphasizes “selection” e¤ects rather than signaling. In the signaling
5In this context, ability normally refers to all skills that are unobserved to employers, and does not
need to be related to innate ability.
36story, the imperfect information is between workers and …rms: workers know their ability,
and …rms are trying to infer it from workers’ education decisions. In the selection story,
certain skills, such as those that were referred to as ability above, are observed by em-
ployers, but not by us in the usual surveys. So the imperfect information is not between
agents in the economy, but between us, the analysts, and the agents. Then, as long as
those obtaining education have higher ability than those not obtaining education, simi-
lar e¤ects will arise. The average ability of those not obtaining education will be lower
than those obtaining education, and more important, as average education increases, the
average ability of workers not obtaining high education will decline. Since in this world
employers observe ability and pay accordingly, their wages will also decline. Below I will
explain in more detail how this mechanism works exactly.
There are a number of reasons for why the contribution of the signaling and selection
e¤ects to the increase in inequality appears to be limited.
A …rst qualitative piece of evidence suggests that signaling and selection e¤ects cannot
by themselves explain the recent changes in inequality in most countries: these e¤ects by
themselves suggest that inequality among educated and uneducated workers should move
in opposite directions (for example, when education increases, there are more marginal
workers added to the more educated group, and less marginal workers left in the less
educated group). However, overall and residual inequality increased among both college
graduates and high school graduates in the U.S.. This suggests that changes in the true
returns to skills have played at least some role in the changes in inequality.
Second, theoretically it is not clear whether signaling and selection e¤ects will really
serve to increase the gap between the wages of high and low education workers. To
discuss this issue, and also clarify how exactly the signaling and selection mechanisms are
supposed to increase inequality, I now outline a simple model with two levels of education
high h =1and low h =0 . Suppose wages are given by
lnwit = ai + °thi (8)
37where hi is a dummy for high education and ai is unobserved ability. De…ne the (log)
education premium—the di¤erence between the average wages of high and low education
workers—as
ln!t ´ E (lnwit j hi =1 )¡ E (lnwit j hi =0 )
= °t + A1t ¡ A0t
where A1t ´ E (ai j hi =1 )and A0t is de…ned similarly. The increase in the educa-
tion premium can be caused by an increase in °t (a true increase in the returns to
skills) or an increase in A1t ¡ A0t. There are basically two reasons for an increase in
A1t ¡ A0t: (1) changes in cohort quality, or (2) changes in the pattern of selection into
education/signaling.
Consider changes in cohort quality …rst. If the high school system has become worse,
we might expect a decline in A0t without a corresponding decline in A1t.A s a r e s u l t ,
A1t ¡ A0t may increase.
Alternatively and more central to the focus of this report, as a larger fraction of the
population obtains higher education, it is natural that selection into education (i.e., the
abilities of those obtaining education) will change. It is in fact possible that those who
are left without education could have very low unobserved ability, which would translate
into a low level of A0t, and therefore into an increase in A1t ¡ A0t. T h i si st h ee s s e n c e
of both the signaling and selection stories—as average education in a cohort (or labor
market) increases, the workers obtaining education will be those who were high ability
relative to the workers not obtaining education, but low ability relative to those already
obtaining education. As a result, average ability in both high education and low education
groups will fall. If the fall in average ability in the low education group is larger, then
both signaling and selection mechanisms will serve to increase inequality.
Nevertheless, the theoretical e¤ects of selection/signaling on the wage gap between
high and low education workers is ambiguous. These interactions will depress not only
38average ability among those not obtaining education, A0t, but they will also depress A1t,
so the net e¤ect is ambiguous. To see this more clearly, assume that there is perfect
sorting—i.e., if an individual with ability a obtains education, all individuals with ability
a0 >awill do so as well. In this case, there will exist a threshold level of ability, a,
such that only those with a>a obtain education. Next consider a uniform distribution
of ai between b0 and b0 + b1, as drawn in Figure 4. Then, in Figure 4, A0 and A1 are




b0 ada = a+b0
2 and A1 = 1
b1¡b0¡a
R b0+b1
a ada = b0+b1+a
2 .S o b o t h A0 and A1
will decline when a decreases to a0 (they shift from the solid lines to the dashed lines)
Moreover, A1 ¡ A0 = b1=2, so it is una¤ected by the decline in a. Intuitively, with a
uniform distribution of ai,w h e na increases, both A0 and A1 fall by exactly the same
amount, so the signaling/selection e¤ects have no in‡uence on the education premium.
Clearly, with other distributions of ability, this extreme result will no longer hold, but
it remains true that both A0 and A1 will fall, and whether this e¤ect will increase or
decrease the education premium is unclear. Overall, therefore, the e¤ects of changes in
selection on education premia is an empirical question.
Empirically, the evidence also suggests that signaling and selection e¤ects have been
limited. There are two types of evidence motivating this conclusion.
First, the importance of selection (and signaling) e¤ects can be uncovered by looking
at inequality changes by cohort (see Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman, 1992; Juhn, Murphy
and Pierce,1993). To see this, rewrite equation (8) as
lnwict = aic + °thic + "cit (9)
where c denotes a cohort—i.e., a group of individuals who are born in the same year.
I have imposed an important assumption in writing equation (9): returns to skills are
assumed to be the same for all cohorts and ages; °t—though clearly they vary over time.
39We can now de…ne cohort speci…c education premia as
ln!ct ´ E (lnwict j hi =1 )¡ E (lnwict j hi =0 )
= °t + A1ct ¡ A0ct
where A1ct ´ E (aic j hi =1 )and A0ct is de…ned similarly. Under the additional assump-
tion that there is no further schooling for any of the cohorts over the periods under study,
we have
ln!ct = °t + A1c ¡ A0c: (10)
This implies
¢ln!c;t0¡t ´ ln!ct0 ¡ ln!ct = °t0 ¡ °t; (11)
i.e., changes in the returns to education within a cohort will reveal the true change in
the returns to skills. One can extend this discussion to the case in which h stands for
unobserved skills, with the only di¤erence that now we will have to look at some …xed
percentile di¤erence in the wage distribution (e.g., 90-10 di¤erence). See the detailed
discussion in Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993).
Nevertheless, the assumption that returns to skills are constant over the lifetime of
an individual may be too restrictive. Murphy and Welch (1992), for example, show
quite di¤erent age earning pro…les by education in the U.S. labor market. Nevertheless,
a similar argument can be applied in this case too. For example, suppose that returns to
skills depend on age, s. Then equation (10) can be written as
ln!cst = °st + A1c ¡ A0c;
for cohort c of age s in year t. Suppose moreover that °st = °s + °t (this assumption is
also not necessary, but simpli…es the discussion). Then
¢ln!c;t0¡t = °s0 ¡ °s + °t0 ¡ °t;
40where obviously s0 ¡ s = t0 ¡ t. Now suppose that we look at a di¤erent cohort, c00 that
is age s0 in the year t and age s in the year t00.W e h a v e
¢ln!c00;t¡t00 = °s0 ¡ °s + °t ¡ °t00:
Therefore, the double di¤erence
¢
2 ln! ´ ¢ln!c;t0¡t ¡ ¢ln!c00;t¡t00 = °t0 ¡ °t00; (12)
will reveal the true change in the returns to skills between the dates t00 and t0.6
Using data from the 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 from the U.S. censuses, Table
2 gives some of the single and double di¤erences of cohort inequality for white men aged
26-55. The single di¤erences show increases in the returns to college within most cohorts,
with the exception of the years between 1970 and 1980. Therefore, these increases are
likely to re‡ect di¤erential age e¤ects by education. In contrast, the numbers in Panel
C for the 1950-70 period show no increases, suggesting that the double di¤erence does
a good job of controlling for selection e¤ects. The numbers for the 1960-80 period
are negative, which likely re‡ect the decline in the college premium between 1960 and
1980. The …nal row gives the most important results of this table. The 1970-90 double
di¤erences are large and positive, suggesting that the true returns to education increased
over this time period in the U.S.. Interestingly, despite the well-known evidence that the
college premium increased faster for younger workers over the 1980s, the results in Table
2 show that the true increase in returns to skills between 1970 and 1990 are comparable
for cohorts born between 1936 and 1955. These results therefore indicate that the major
component of the increase in the college premium during the 1980s and 90s in the U.S.
was changes in skill prices, not selection/signaling e¤ects.
6A di¤erent form of (8) would be lnwict = °t (aic + hic)+"cit, which would imply that returns to
observed and unobserved skills are the same. For the purposes of the exercise here, which is to show
that there must have been an increase in the true returns to skill, °t, this is not a major di¤erence. If
°t were constant, then even with this more general form we would …nd that ¢2 ln! =0 .
41Table 3, which replicates Table 3 from Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), shows that
the increase in overall and residual inequality cannot be explained by composition e¤ects
either. For example, Panel A shows that the 90-10 di¤erential for cohorts entering the
market between 1935 and 1964 is approximately constant between 1964 and 1970, but
increases sharply for each cohort between 1970 and 1976, and then increases further in
1982 and 1988. Panel B shows a similar picture for log wage residuals. These results
suggest that the changes in the structure of wages observed over the past 30 years cannot
be explained by selection or signaling e¤ects alone, and these e¤ects are likely to be
limited.
The second piece of evidence that signaling e¤ects are limited comes from results
reported in Acemoglu and Angrist (2000). They estimate the e¤ects of increases in average
schooling in U.S. states between 1920 and 1960, driven by changes in compulsory schooling
laws, on average wages. In the presence of signaling, average wages should increase by less
than that implied by cross-sectional wage regression (i.e. by less than 6-8 percent, see for
example Card, 1999). In the presence of signi…cant human capital externalities, average
wages should increase by more. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) …nd that average wages
increased by similar amounts to those implied by cross-sectional wage regressions. In other
words, they do not …nd evidence for positive or negative human capital externalities. This
evidence therefore suggests that the e¤ects of signaling on wages are also limited.
4.2 Rent-Sharing in the Labor Market
Another important dimension ignored in the framework of Part 3 is the presence of labor
market rents. In many labor markets, wages are not simply determined by marginal
products, but re‡ect other factors. Two important ones are likely to be rent-sharing
because of market power of workers and e¢ciency wages. If these rents were proportional
to marginal product, the conclusions derived in Part 3 would apply. However, there are
reasons for thinking that the extent to which workers receive these labor market rents
42has changed over time, and it to may have changed di¤erentially for skilled and unskilled
workers (high and low education workers). For example, it may be the case that today
managers and nonproduction workers receive at least as much in rents as before, while
production workers receive fewer rents.
In the context of the U.S. labor market, there are three potential reasons why the
distribution of labor market rents may have changed. First, worker rents depend on
how e¤ectively they bargain with their employers, which in turn is a function of how
well they are organized. Unions have traditionally played the role of coordinating worker
bargaining. The importance of unions in the U.S. labor market has declined over the past
30 years. This may have had two important implications: (i) since unions are typically
stronger in manufacturing sectors, their weakening may have reduced the wages of semi-
skilled workers in manufacturing; (ii) for ideological or other reasons, unions traditionally
compress the structure of wages within …rms (see for example Freeman and Medo¤, 1984).
Throughout the postwar period in the U.S. economy, unions negotiated the wages for
many occupations, even indirectly in‡uenced managerial salaries (see DiNardo, Hallock
and Pischke, 2000). Unions also explicitly tried to compress wage di¤erentials. The decline
of unions may have removed this wage compression, increasing wage inequality. There is
also evidence that wage inequality has increased more among non-unionized workers than
unionized workers (see Freeman, 1991, DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1995, Card, 1996).
Second, the real value of the U.S. minimum wage has fallen sharply during the 1980s
(see, for example, DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1995, and Lee, 1999). The minimum
wage often increases the earnings of low-paid workers, and may cause overall wage com-
pression, reducing inequality (e.g., Freeman and Medo¤, 1984). So the erosion of the
minimum wage may have shifted rents from workers to …rms, and from low-paid workers
to high paid workers.
The third reason why the distribution of rents in the labor market may have changed
is related to the increase in international trade. Although I have argued that the direct
43e¤ect of international trade has been limited, there is a potential indirect e¤ect of inter-
national trade which may have been important for the wages of some workers. Imagine
a situation in which production workers receive rents because of bargaining. Increased
international trade, or the possibility of outsourcing, will act to increase the bargaining
power of employers, and through this channel, reduce labor market rents. This may have
contributed to the decline in the wages of certain groups of workers (see, for example,
Borjas and Ramey (1995), Rodrik (1996)).
Although all of these channels are likely to have contributed somewhat to the increase
in inequality, there are unlikely to have been the major factors. There are three reasons
for this:
1. It appears likely that deunionization and the decline in the real value of minimum
wages have played at least some role in the increase in wage dispersion in the U.S.
labor market (see Freeman, 1991, DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1995, Lee, 1999).
Nevertheless, the timing of both deunionization and the erosion of the real value
of the minimum wage suggests that these changes are not by themselves the major
driving force of the increase in inequality. In the U.S., minimum wages started
falling only in the 1980s, after the …rst large surge in inequality. U.S. deunionization
also started in the 1950s, a period of stable wage inequality (Troy, 1990). During
the 1970s, although unionization fell in the private sector, overall unionization rates
did not decline much because of increased unionization in the public sector. Overall
union density was approximately constant, around 30 percent of the workforce,
between 1960 and 1975. It was the anti-union atmosphere of the 1980s and perhaps
the defeat of the Air Tra¢c Controllers’ Strike that led to the most major declines
of the unions, once again dating the sharp declines in unionization after the rapid
increase in inequality during the early 1970s.7
7An interesting recent paper Farber and Western (2000) date the major decline in union activity to
the early 1980s, a few months before the Air-tra¢c Controllers Strike.
44Evidence from other countries also paints a similar picture. For example, in the
UK, wage inequality started its sharp increase in the mid 70s, while union density
increased until 1980 and started the rapid decline only during the 1980s (Gosling,
1998). In Canada, while unionization rates increased from around 30 percent in the
1960s to over 36 percent in the late 1980s (Riddell, 1993, table 4.1), wage inequality
also increased (for example, the 90-10 log wage di¤erences were higher both among
college graduates in high school graduates in 1986 than in 1975 and in 1979, see,
e.g., Freeman and Needels, 1993, …gure 2.4).
2. Wage dispersion in the U.S. increased in all occupations, even in those that had
little contact with unions and that were not a¤ected by minimum wages, such as
lawyers, doctors, engineers etc. (e.g., Juhn et al, 1993). Moreover, wage inequality
increased very similarly at the top and the bottom of the U. S. wage distribution.
Figure 5 plots the behavior of the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 log wage di¤erentials in the
U.S. labor market. The 90-10 di¤erential is a common measure of wage dispersion.
The 90-50 gives how wage dispersion has changed at the top of the distribution,
since it compares high earners to the median of the distribution. Similarly, the 50-
10 di¤erential shows how wage dispersion is change at the bottom. The remarkable
feature in Figure 5 is that all three inequality measures track each other very closely.
This suggests that similar factors have a¤ected both the top and the bottom of the
wage distribution. Many of the rent-sharing stories, however, suggest di¤erential
behavior, since, according to these stories, the rents of the relatively low earners are
being cut.
3. If these rent-sharing e¤ects were important, we would expect a large component of
the increase in inequality to be due to changes in average wages across industries.
Murphy and Welch (1992) show that the contribution of changes in average wages
across industries (industry e¤ects) is very small.
45These considerations imply that changes in the distribution of labor market rents is
unlikely to have been the major determinant of the changes in the wage and income
distribution. This does not mean, however, that changes in these rents played no role
in the changes in the wage structure nor that labor market imperfections are themselves
unimportant. The decline in the real value of the earnings of low-paid workers in the U.S.
is likely to be related to the declining power of the unions and the erosion of the minimum
wage. I will discuss the importance of labor market imperfections further in the next part
of the report.
4.3 Good Jobs Versus Bad Jobs
A variety of evidence suggests that major changes in the structure of …rms have been
taking place in the U.S. economy over 25 years. For example, team production and other
high-performance production methods are now widespread in the U.S. economy (e.g., Ichi-
nowski,et al. 1997, or Applebaum and Batt, 1994, Cappelli and Wilk, 1997). Yet in the
meantime, many relatively high-paying manufacturing jobs that were previously open to
low or semi-skilled workers have disappeared. Murnane and Levy (1996) report case study
evidence consistent with these patterns. From their interviews with human resource per-
sonnel at a number of companies, they describe the change in the hiring practices of U.S.
companies. A manager at Ford Motor company in 1967 describes their hiring strategy
as follows: “If we had a vacancy, we would look outside in the plant waiting room to
see if there were any warm bodies standing there. If someone was there and they looked
physically OK and weren’t an obvious alcoholic, they were hired” (p. 19). In contrast,
comparable companies in the late 1980s appear to use a very di¤erent recruitment strat-
egy. Murnane and Levy discuss the cases of Honda of America, Diamond Star Motors
and Northwestern Mutual Life. All three companies spend substantial resources on re-
cruitment and hire only a fraction of those who apply. Kremer and Maskin (1999) provide
evidence of more segregation of workers across establishments. It seems that high wage
46workers are now much more concentrated in certain establishments.
Similarly, in Acemoglu (1999a) I documented a change in the composition of jobs
over the past 20 years. Figure 6 here replicates a pattern found in that paper. This
…gure plots the total percentage of workers employed in the top 25 percent and bottom
25 percent industry-occupation cells (what I called Weight-at-the-tails of the job quality
distribution). In other words, these are the cells (job types) that pay relatively high or
relatively low wages. In 1983, 35 percent of employment was in the top and bottom 25
percent job categories. By 1993, this number had risen to just under 38 percent. So,
approximately 2.5 percent more workers now have either higher or lower quality jobs
rather than medium quality jobs.8 The actual changes in the distribution of jobs may
be much larger than this since substantial changes in the types of jobs often take place
within given occupations (industries).
Changes in the quality-distribution of jobs could be important for wage inequality.
Many relatively low skill workers (for example high school graduates) previously worked in
jobs that paid high wages, such as manufacturing jobs. When this type of manufacturing
jobs disappears, this could increase wage inequality by forcing these workers to work for
lower wages.
Although changes in the quality distribution of jobs are likely to have been an im-
portant intervening mechanism for the increase in inequality in the U.S., the fact that
such changes have occurred does not overturn our main conclusions. Still technological
changes that will increase the demand for skills, or even facilitate further changes in the
quality distribution of jobs, are likely to increase inequality further. And the workers who
lose out as a consequence of the changes in the quality distribution of jobs are those with
low skills. Therefore, the most important objective of human capital policies should be
to close the skills gap between the top and the bottom of the distribution.
Nevertheless, the presence of good and bad jobs introduces a number of new consider-
8This happens both with the weights at the left and right tails becoming larger (see Acemoglu, 1999a).
47ations when we discuss other types of policies. There are also reasons to suspect that the
economy may be under-supplying good jobs. In Acemoglu (2001), I argued that …rms will
typically underinvest in the creation of high-quality jobs. The reason is that such jobs
naturally are more productive, but in the presence of labor market imperfections, this
higher productivity will enable workers to bargain to higher wages. This means that the
opening of the high-quality jobs creates a positive (pecuniary) externality in that it leads
to higher wages for their employees. Firms do not take this externality into account, and
therefore, tend to under-supply high wage jobs. This implies that a change in the quality
distribution of jobs will not only increase inequality, but may also lead to a deterioration
in the allocation of resources.
There are also other reasons why the quality distribution of jobs may be relevant
for inequality. It may be argued that low-wage jobs (such as retail jobs or jobs in fast
food restaurants) provide limited opportunities for on-the-job learning and human capital
accumulation. As a result, a large fraction of “bad” jobs (low productivity jobs) may
imply that the number of workers will not only receive low wages today, but will have
few opportunities to move to higher wage jobs. One example for why this may happen is
that retail or fast food restaurant jobs rarely o¤er extensive training. In contrast, many
workers who take this type of jobs in the U.S., would be employed in some manufacturing
establishments in Germany, where with the apprenticeship system, they would be receiving
extensive training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998).
Nevertheless, there are also arguments against the point of view that we should care
about what fraction of jobs are “good” (high-paying) and what fraction are “bad” (low-
paying). For example, Topel and Ward (1992) document that a male worker in the
U.S. will on average change six jobs during the …rst ten years of his labor market market
experience. More important, they show that many of these job changes are associated with
wage gains. The interpretation that they suggest is that there is a considerable amount of
learning (or accumulation of match-speci…c human capital) taking place during the early
48years of a worker’s career, for example regarding what type of jobs this worker is suited
to, etc.. The fact that wages increase rapidly during times of job change is consistent with
this interpretation. This point of view therefore suggests that workers may often need to
start from low-paying jobs, and then move to higher paying jobs. Although this evidence
is interesting and to some degree convincing, the exact implications for the debate about
good vs. bad jobs is unclear. The learning story does not suggest that workers should
start from low productivity jobs in fast food restaurants and then move to higher paying
manufacturing jobs. In contrast, they should start in sectors in which they suspect they
will be a good match. Therefore, a plausible interpretation for Topel and Ward (1992)’s
…ndings is that although there is some amount of learning, part of the movements out of
low-paying into high-paying jobs re‡ects the fact that many young workers cannot …nd
high-paying jobs at …rst.
Another relevant aspect is that certain policies are likely to a¤ect the quality distri-
bution of jobs (the fraction of good vs. bad jobs). In particular, policies that encourage
wage compression, such as minimum wages or unemployment bene…ts, imply that …rms
will have to pay high wages to their employees. Once they realize that they will pay higher
wages, it makes more sense for the employers to increase the productivity of their workers.
Previously (i.e., before wage compression), some bad jobs which paid low wages but were
also less productive may have been pro…table for employers. However, once employers are
forced to pay higher wages even in these low productivity jobs, they may opt for higher
productivity jobs. Acemoglu (2001) demonstrates that this argument applies quite gener-
ally, and also provides empirical evidence suggesting that increases in minimum wages and
unemployment bene…ts shift the distribution of employment from low-wage occupations
to high-wage occupations. I return to this topic in the next part of the report.
494.4 Concluding Comments
This part of the proposal has surveyed additional determinants of wage inequality, includ-
ing the e¤ect of signaling and selection on inequality, the importance of changes in rent
sharing, and the possible e¤ects of changes in the composition of jobs. All three of these
factors could in theory be important determinants of inequality, and even modify some
of the conclusions reached at the end of the previous part. Nevertheless, I conclude that
these considerations do not modify the main conclusions reached above.
In summary,
1. Although in the presence of signaling, increased education may contribute to in-
creased inequality because low education workers may be viewed as low ability, this
case is theoretically not very likely. Moreover, the evidence from the U.S. suggests
that the importance of signaling and selection e¤ects on wages are limited, and
changes in selection and signaling appear to have played a relatively minor role in
the increase in U.S. inequality.
2. Changes in the distribution of labor market rents, among workers or between workers
and …rms, are likely to have also contributed to the increase in U.S. inequality.
Nevertheless, existing evidence suggests that these factors are not the major cause
of the increase in inequality, but simply contributing forces.
3. On the other hand, there is evidence that the composition of jobs has changed
signi…cantly in the U.S. labor market, and these changes may have been important
in a¤ecting the distribution of wages. Nevertheless, the presence of such changes
does not a¤ect the conclusions reached at the end of the previous part.
Overall, I conclude that as emphasized in the previous part, the most e¤ective policies
for reducing inequality are likely to be those that close the skill gaps among workers.
505 Incentives to Invest in Human Capital
In this part of the report, I discuss incentives to invest in human capital. An understanding
of these incentives is crucial for a discussion of human capital policies and their welfare
implications.
The two important types of human capital investments are education and on-the-job
training. While education investments are often made before individuals arrive in the
labor market, training takes place concurrent with or after some labor market experience.
This is by no means the only di¤erence between education and training, however. While
education often tends to be general-purpose, in the sense that the human capital that an
individual acquires as a result of education can be used in a variety of di¤erent activities,
training often provides human capital useful for speci…c tasks. Perhaps more important,
while education decisions are made by an individual and his family, training investments
are not only under the control of the individual, but are made jointly with the employer.
This complicates the analysis, and raises a number of additional issues. For all of these
reasons, I will discuss education decisions and training decisions separately.
A usual starting place for any investment problem is the observation that individuals
who control the investment decision will choose the level that equates marginal bene…t
to marginal cost. In the case of education, there are many factors a¤ecting costs and
bene…ts, and the picture is also more complicated because families often play some role
in determining their children’s education investments.
5.1 Bene…ts of Education
A key determinant of the bene…ts to investing in education is the skill premium. When
the skill premium—or more speci…cally in this case, the return to schooling— is larger,
each year of schooling will have a higher …nancial reward for the worker. We may therefore
expect schooling to increase when skill premia and wage inequality are high. This is good
news, since it suggests that higher inequality will create a tendency for the relative supply
51of skills to increase, and through the channels discussed in Part 3, this increase in the
relative supply of skills may be expected to reduce inequality. Proponents of this view …nd
support in the fact that U.S. college enrollment rose during the 1980s when the college
premium was increasing sharply (e.g. Mincer, 1995, Topel, 1997). For example, Topel
(1997) compares the increase in education in the U.S. to the behavior of enrollments in
Sweden, and argues that the greater increase in enrollments in the U.S. is evidence for the
view that greater inequality will encourage education, and will tend to self-correct itself.
Nevertheless, there is little evidence overall to guide our thinking on how important
these e¤ects could be. First, it has to be borne in mind that, as pointed out in Part
3, the e¤ects of an increase in the relative supply of skills are likely to work slowly, and
there may be a number of countervailing e¤ects, such as the adjustment of technology to
the increase in the supply of skilled workers.
Perhaps more important, a quick look at the data does not show overwhelming ev-
idence that the e¤ect of returns on education are large, or consistently in the direction
predicted by simple economic theory. Acemoglu and Pischke (2000) analyzed the behavior
of college enrollments across U.S. states. According to the simple economic reasoning
discussed above, enrollments should have increased more in states where wage inequality
and returns to schooling rose more substantially. In contrast, Acemoglu and Pischke
do not …nd any evidence of such a correlation. Although migration of educated workers
across states could explain the lack of such a correlation, Acemoglu and Pischke also show
that the extent of migration is more limited than commonly believed, and migration does
not appear to be arbitraging return to schooling di¤erences. To further investigate this
issue, one can look at the cross-country evidence. Acemoglu and Pischke also look at
whether there has been more investment in higher education in OECD economies experi-
encing more rapidly increasing inequality. This cross-country evidence also failed to show
any correlation between returns and higher education. This still leaves the large increase
in enrollments in the U.S. labor market during the 1980s, a period during which returns
52to schooling also increased.
I conclude that the evidence on the e¤ect of returns to schooling on schooling decisions
is ambiguous, and shows no clear evidence that higher returns to schooling have a large
e¤ect on education. So it would be too optimistic to rely on the self-correcting forces
within the market.
5.2 Costs of Education
The other side of the equation determining education decisions are the costs faced by
individuals. Here it is useful to distinguish between pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs.
Pecuniary costs consist of the tuition and living expenses that individuals will incur during
their schooling and foregone earnings because they will not be working during the period
in which they receive education. I will discuss how various policies that a¤ect these costs
impact on education. For now it su¢ces to note that the consensus in the literature
is that policies that reduce tuition costs or provide aid to students are highly e¤ective.
For example, McPherson and Schapiro (1991) and Leslie and Brinkman (1987) survey a
variety of studies showing that higher tuition costs discourage college enrollments while
aid encourages enrollments.
Here I will brie‡y discuss another component of these costs; costs of borrowing money,
or more generally costs of imperfect consumption smoothing resulting from education
investments. It is well known that in a world with perfect credit markets, individuals will
invest an amount only determined by the marginal cost of investment and the marginal
return. Whether they have high income during the period of investment is immaterial,
since they can borrow at the going market interest rate, smooth their consumption, and
then repay their loans during their employment period.
This separation between investments and consumption decisions no longer applies
once we move away from perfect credit markets. For example, in the extreme case
where individuals cannot borrow, investment in education will come at the cost of very
53low consumption during the period of investment. Since individuals typically like to
smooth consumption, i.e., they dislike periods of very low consumption, the e¤ective cost
of investing in education would be much higher, and education investments would be
discouraged. An extreme case would be when individuals cannot borrow at all, and
they do not have enough money to a¤ord education. In this case, education becomes
impossible. In many countries, these types of problems motivate the presence of education
loans to enable students to attend school. I will discuss such policies in the next part of
the report as well.
It is also useful at this point to touch upon nonpecuniary costs of education. Educa-
tion is a substantial investment not only in terms of money, but time and life plans. How
individuals value the time they spend learning will clearly be an important determinant
of whether they will undertake these education investments. We can think that socio-
logical/psychological factors that determine how education is valued will therefore a¤ect
costs of education. Most important among these factors may be family and peer group
e¤ects: that is, how the immediate family and friends of an individual value education.
This may be an important determinant for why individuals who grow up in inner cities, or
poor neighborhoods with little education, are themselves less likely to obtain education.
I will return to these issues as well in the next part.
5.3 Market Failures in Education Decisions
Although the main focus of this report is how human capital policies can be used to reduce
inequality, such a discussion cannot be separated from whether there is underinvestment
in education. For example, imagine a hypothetical situation in which, because of gov-
ernment support for education, all individuals are already receiving more education than
the socially optimal amount. In this case, further human capital policies could be used
to encourage more education, but since there was overinvestment in education to start
with, any further increase in education would have high costs, not only in terms of money
54spent, but also in distorting the allocation of resources. In contrast, in a society in which
there is underinvestment in education, human capital policies that encourage education
may have a double bene…t: reducing inequality and improving the allocation of resources.
These considerations motivate a careful discussion of whether there are market failures in
education, and whether these are likely to lead to under or over-investment.
There are a number of reasons for market failures in education:
1. As discussed above, credit market problems may prevent individuals from choosing
the right amount of education. This will typically lead to underinvestment in
education.
2. Often, education decisions are not taken by individuals alone, but by their fami-
lies. For example, families often contribute towards schooling expenses. However,
parents may be only imperfectly altruistic, that is, they may not care su¢ciently
about their children. In this case, they will tend to underinvest in their children’s
education.
3. There may also be human capital externalities, in the sense that the productivity of
a worker may increase in the human capital of other workers in the economy. An
obvious case where this could apply is that of scientists. High human capital sci-
entists are more likely to make new discoveries, in which case other scientists could
build on these discoveries, to make new ones. In less extreme forms, similar type
of externalities because of exchange of ideas may arise in a number of occupations.
Moreover, in Acemoglu (1996), I showed that pecuniary human capital externali-
ties may arise when labor markets are not perfectly competitive: when there are
more skilled workers in the labor market, …rms invest more in their physical capi-
tal anticipating to produce with these workers, and as a result, all workers bene…t
from these larger physical capital investments. Because individuals only take into
account their own private returns, human capital externalities will also imply that
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4. There can also be externalities on the cost side. Recall the discussion of peer group
e¤ects where the costs of education are determined by the attitudes of friends and
neighbors. An individual who invests in education is more likely to have a positive
attitude towards education. Therefore, an individual, by investing in education,
does not only increase his own returns, but also a¤ects the costs of people around
him. Once again, individuals will not take this type of externality into account,
and underinvest in education.
5. A …nal market failure will arise because of imperfect information regarding ability.
As discussed in Part 4, when there is such informational imperfections, education
may act as a signal. However, when education acts as a signal, it not only increases
the wage of the worker who has invested, but also reduces the wages of those not
obtaining education (this is because those not obtaining education are then perceived
as lower ability). In this case, we may expect overinvestment in education.
Before a further discussion of these issues, it is useful to note that these market failures
refer to the case in which there is no government intervention. Clearly, in all countries
governments are heavily involved in providing and subsidizing education. So it is pos-
sible that even though in the absence of government intervention there would have been
underinvestment in education, due to government intervention the amount of investment
may be greater than optimal. This caveat has to be borne in mind in the discussion of
market failures in education.
Taking all of these issues into consideration, is there likely to be under or overinvest-
ment in education? This is a very di¢cult question to answer, and there is no single
study that takes all of these aspects into consideration. Therefore, in my discussion I
will focus separately on two aspects: how important are credit market problems? And,
how important are human capital externalities and signaling e¤ects? I will start with a
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of the joint signi…cance of signaling issues and human capital externalities.
Although the proposition that credit market problems will a¤ect education deci-
sions, and cause underinvestment appears plausible, its importance in relatively developed
economies may be limited. In most OECD economies, individuals have access to loans
and there is already some public …nancing of investment. Despite these existing loans and
subsidies, are credit market problems still important?
There is a way of investigating this question directly. The prediction of standard
theory in the absence of credit market problems is very clear. The income of the family
or the individual contemplating education should play no role in this decision: as pointed
out above, education is a pure investment decision, so individuals should undertake the
correct amount, and use the credit market to smooth their consumption. This of course
does not mean that all individuals should choose the same level of education. There may
be ability di¤erences, or other di¤erences, dictating that di¤erent individuals should invest
up to di¤erent levels of schooling. For example, children with more educated families may
…nd it easier to invest in education, because of family support or other issues, so may
invest to a higher level even in the absence of credit market problems. So it is important
to control for such di¤erences in an investigation of whether family resources and income
matter for education decisions.
Although there are numerous studies investigating the impact of family resources on
education outcomes, whether income truly matters is still a hotly debated issue. Early
studies in this area have been surveyed by Haveman and Wolfe (1995). Most studies
just relate schooling outcomes to family income in OLS equations. However, in ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions, family income may be proxying for family characteristics
a¤ecting “the education production function” (Lang and Ruud, 1986). In fact, many
studies …nd that including parents’ education and controls for type of school attended
previously or test scores substantially reduce the e¤ect of the family income on children’s
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Taber, 2000). Nevertheless, such estimates of the income elasticity of education may be
seriously biased downwards. First, there are substantial measurement error and transitory
movements in incomes measured at a point in time. Both of these factors will attenuate
the e¤ect of income on education, or in other words, they will create a downward bias in
the estimates of the e¤ect of family income on education. This attenuation bias will be
worse if other variables correlated with permanent income, like parents’ education or the
type of secondary school chosen, are included as controls. Intuitively, these other variables
will capture some of the true e¤ect of family income, because they are correlated with
family income, and our measure of family income is less than a perfect measure. As a
result, the estimate of the income e¤ect may be substantially understated. Second, test
scores and previous schooling experience are likely to be endogenous and also a¤ected by
family income, so their inclusion may lead to biased estimates.
A di¤erent strategy is to exploit exogenous variation in parents’ income. The negative
income tax experiments provide the only experimental study of the e¤ect of income on
schooling, but they confound the e¤ect of income with changes in marginal tax rates
a¤ecting the decisions of youths to work (see e.g. Venti, 1984). A few recent studies have
made other attempts to address the possibility that income may also be correlated with
unobserved factors which predict schooling outcomes of the child. Duncan et al. (1998)
use sibling di¤erences arguing that family income varies while other family characteristics
remain the same. Shea (2000) uses industry and union wage di¤erentials and income
changes due to job displacement as instruments for family income and argues that these
proxy “luck.” He …nds no e¤ects of parental resources on education, but his estimates are
quite imprecise. Both of Shea’s instruments are also not entirely convincing, since they are
likely correlated with parental attitudes towards education. Perhaps more interesting is
Du‡o (2000) who exploits the expansion of old-age pensions in South Africa to analyze the
e¤ect of family resources on child health. Like education, child health should be una¤ected
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correspond to a type of investment. Du‡o …nds positive e¤ect of resources on health,
though given the di¤erences in the level of development between South Africa and OECD
economies, it is not clear whether these results can be generalized to OECD economies or
New Zealand. Mayer (1997) also …nds an e¤ect of family income on education, using a
variety of methods. However, she also emphasizes that the e¤ect of income is quite small,
and nonincome characteristics of families are likely to be much more important in shaping
children’s education.
Finally, Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) exploit the changes in the distribution of family
income in the U.S. that have taken place over the past 30 years to estimate the e¤ect of
parental resources on college education. This strategy exploits the fact that families at
the bottom of the income distribution were much poorer in the 1990s than they were in
the 1970s, while the opposite is true for families in the top quartile of the distribution.
This approach is attractive since it exploits variations in family income caused by changes
in the U.S. income distribution, which are unlikely to be correlated with other (observed
and unobserved) characteristics a¤ecting education choices. Their estimates suggest large
e¤ects of family income on enrollments. For example, they …nd that a 10 percent increase
in family income is associated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in the probability of
attending a four-year college.
Overall, the evidence on whether family income matters for education decisions and
hence whether credit market problems are important is mixed. My own reading is that
there is evidence suggesting that credit market imperfections are important, but given the
already existing levels of subsidies for education, it is not clear whether this evidence calls
for further subsidies. A more sensible policy may be to expand existing loan programs
for investment in higher education. If credit market problems are not important, the
expansion of such loan programs would not have any adverse e¤ects, and if credit market
problems are important, such programs could be very useful. I return to this topic in the
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What about human capital externalities and signaling? I combine the discussion of
these two topics, because the same type of evidence is useful in evaluating the aggregate
implications of both. When there are signi…cant human capital externalities, the social
return to human capital will exceed the private return. More speci…cally, de…ne the social
return as how much the society bene…ts from a given increase in the human capital of all
workers—for example, a one-year increase in the education of all employees. The private
return, on the other hand, is how much an individual bene…ts from increasing his/her
education. There are many reasons for the social and the private returns to di¤er. For
example, if other factors of production, such as capital, are in scarce supply, these two
returns could di¤er. More important and interesting for our purposes, they will also di¤er
if either human capital externalities or signaling are important.
When human capital externalities are important, an individual becomes more pro-
ductive as a result of others in the economy increasing their human capital. This would
immediately imply that social returns are greater than private returns. If, on the other
hand, schooling has signaling value, social returns to education will be less than private
returns. In the extreme case where schooling does not increase human capital but is only
a signal, aggregate income is unchanged when all workers increase their schooling by one
year, so social returns are zero.
This discussion suggests that by comparing social and private returns, we can see
whether human capital externalities or signaling are important. If social returns exceed
private returns, human capital externalities would be important, and if private returns
exceed social returns, signaling would be important. How can we measure social returns?
One method of investigating the di¤erence between private and social returns is to
look at what happens to earnings or wages in a given labor market when there is a large
increase in the human capital of all the workers there. More straightforwardly, we can
look at the e¤ect of changes in average schooling (human capital) in a labor market on
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equations of the following form:
lnwi = ° ¢ si + X
0
i ¢ ¯
where lnwi is log earnings or wages of individual i, si is his/her years of schooling, and Xi
is a set of other controls, including experience, sex, geographic and demographic controls.
The typical estimate of ° is between 0.06 and 0.1, indicating that a one-year increase
in education increases individual earnings by between 6 and 10 percent (see for example
Card, 1999, Angrist and Krueger, 1991).
To …nd out the the di¤erence between social and private returns, we can run an
extended version of this regression of the form
lnwi = ° ¢ si + µ ¢ Si + X
0
i ¢ ¯
where Si is average schooling in the labor market in which individual i is working. In this
regression, µ is the di¤erence between social and private returns (or what Acemoglu and
Angrist, 2000, call external returns). When all individuals in a given area increase their
education by one year, wages increase by a factor of (° + µ),s ow h e nµ<0,s o c i a lr e t u r n s
are less than private returns, and conversely when µ>0, social returns are greater than
private returns.
Rauch (1993) is the …rst attempt to estimate a regression of this form. Rauch’s results
suggest that there are externalities on the order of 3-5 percent, though he also reports
some considerably larger estimates. Rauch’s estimates are driven by di¤erences in average
schooling across cities. But higher incomes might cause more schooling instead of vice
versa. Cities with greater average schooling may also have higher wages for a variety of
other reasons.
To solve this problem, one needs to identify an exogenous source of variation in average
human capital in a given labor market. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) accomplish this by
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exploit di¤erences in compulsory attendance laws and child labor laws in U.S. states
between 1920 and 1960, which had large e¤ect on average education in these states. They
…nd that µ is positive, but very small, typically in the order of 0.01, and statistically
not signi…cant. This evidence suggests that the extent of human capital externalities are
limited, and social returns do not signi…cantly exceed private returns. The fact that µ is
almost always positive also rules out signi…cant signaling e¤ects.
5.4 Training in Competitive Labor Markets
Academic economists have been interested in training for a long time. Pigou (1912)
argued that …rms would not have e¢cient incentives to invest in their workers’ skills
because trained workers can quit to work for other employers who can use these skills.
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), in his famous article on the “big push”, not only pointed out the
importance of market demand, but also of skills, and noted that training of workers was
a prerequisite for industrialization, though unlikely to happen. These early contributions,
therefore, emphasized the di¢culties faced by a market economy in achieving the right
level of investment in worker skills. The policy prescription from these studies was that
government subsidies were necessary for on-the-job training as well as for schooling.
Current thinking on training is shaped by the seminal work of Gary Becker, which
reaches quite di¤erent conclusions. Becker (1964) drew a crucial distinction between
general and speci…c skills. General skills are de…ned as those which are also useful with
other employers. In contrast, speci…c skills increase the productivity of the worker only
in his current job. Notice that general skills in Becker’s sense are not the same as general-
purpose skills as de…ned above. General-purpose skills are those that are useful in a variety
of tasks, and they may often be more abstract skills. General skills in this context, in
contrast, may be highly speci…c to a certain task or industry. But they are general in
the sense that the skills are not only useful with a single employer, but with a variety
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…rms competing to employ the worker who possesses the skills.
Becker pointed out that Pigou’s arguments apply to general skills. In fact, in a compet-
itive labor market where workers receive their marginal product, …rms could never recoup
their investments in general skills, so they will never pay for general training. However,
Becker noted, workers themselves will have the right incentives to improve their general
skills because in competitive markets, they are the sole bene…ciaries of the improvements
in their productivity. Moreover, workers can undertake such investments quite easily by
accepting a lower wage than their productivity during the period of training. This argu-
ment appears to account well for the apprenticeship systems of earlier centuries, where
apprentices often paid fees or worked for very low-pay until they mastered a certain trade.
Becker also argued that training in speci…c skills was quite di¤erent because workers would
not bene…t from higher productivity when they changed jobs. Firms therefore could re-
coup their investments in speci…c skills and would be willing to share some of the costs of
speci…c training investments.
An important conclusion of this work is that there need not be any market failure
in training. As long as workers can pay for training, either out of their pockets or by
taking lower wages, the right amount of investment would be undertaken. So insu¢cient
investment in skills could only arise because workers are severely credit constrained. But
in this case, the solution may be better loan markets rather than direct subsidies to
training. Becker’s seminal contribution, therefore, seriously questions the argument in
favor of government regulation and subsidies for training.
To explain more clearly why …rms will not invest in the general training of their
employees, but workers will have the right incentives, and what may go wrong in the
presence of credit market problems or contractual imperfections, it is useful to consider a
simple model. Suppose that a worker is hired at time 0 during which he can be trained,
and then he becomes productive at time 1. Let me normalize the productivity of the
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where ¿ is his level of training. Training costs c(¿), there is no discounting, and all parties
are risk-neutral. Figure 7 draws these two functions. Assume that all skills are general in
order to focus on the case of interest for our purposes, so the productivity of the worker
is f(¿) in other …rms as well.
Denote the wage of a worker with training ¿ at time 1 by w(¿). A competitive labor
market corresponds to the case where many …rms compete for the labor services of the
worker at time 1, ensuring that w(¿)=f(¿). If this were not the case, every …rm would be
willing to hire the worker, creating excess demand for his labor services. The signi…cant
feature is that the wage of the worker at the initial employer is no di¤erent than the wage
the worker can obtain at a di¤erent …rm, because all of his skills are general and there are
no mobility costs. This immediately implies that the …rm will not pay for the worker’s
training as it would not be able to recoup its investment costs.
So if the …rm will not pay for training in a competitive labor market, will the worker?
To answer this question, …rst consider the hypothetical case where the worker can choose
the amount of training and has the resources to pay for it. It is clear that in a competitive
labor market, the worker is the residual claimant of the returns generated by the training
investments. He will therefore choose the e¢cient amount of investment, given by ¿¤ > 0
where c0(¿¤)=f0(¿¤), as shown in Figure 7. This is the outcome discussed by Becker.
The market achieves the e¢cient level of training without …rms making any investments
in worker skills. There are, however, two important requirements for this to happen.
The …rst is that the worker must have the resources to invest in training. In the case
we have just described, the worker is not productive during time 0. He must therefore
make a payment to the …rm to compensate for the expenses that the …rm incurs. In
practice, most on-the-job training is not full-time, so the worker can take part in some
productive activities. This would enable him to bear the costs of training by taking a
wage cut, rather than making a payment to the …rm. Such wage cuts are costly, however,
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example, with a concave, time separable utility function, the worker would like to have
the same level of consumption in both periods. Taking a wage cut at time 0, without
a possible loan, would take him away from his desired consumption path. Hence, even
when workers are productive during their training, e¢cient investment in skills requires
perfect loan markets. These are unlikely to exist because of the inherent moral hazard
and adverse selection problems. So the ability of workers to invest in training is likely to
be limited in practice.
There is a second condition for workers to be able to invest in general skills. As pointed
out above, training is di¤erent from schooling in that training investments have to be
undertaken jointly by …rms and workers. Although workers can take vocational courses,
many skills are best learned by on-the-job training, combining production, learning-by-
doing, and mentoring by more experienced colleagues. However, the employment relation
gives the control over the worker’s time to his employer. It is therefore possible for a …rm
to pay a low wage with a training promise, and then use the worker in regular production
activities.
This possibility could be avoided if what constitutes training were easily observed by
courts, so that employment contracts could unambiguously specify the training obligations
of the employer. Nevertheless, since important parts of the training program are intangi-
ble, involving mentoring, advice and practice, it is quite hard to specify them in advance
and monitor the …rm’s compliance in individual cases. This problem might be overcome
in a dynamic world, where a …rm that does not deliver on its training promises would
develop a bad reputation. But, training practices inside the …rm are hard to observe by
outsiders, and returns to training depend on individual worker’s ability and e¤ort, making
it hard to infer training from future earnings of workers. So this reputation mechanism
is also highly imperfect. With this reasoning, for example, outside agencies and works
councils in Germany monitor the curriculum and implementation of apprenticeship pro-
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…rms and workers as an additional constraint on workers’ ability to “buy” training in the
workplace.
The above discussion shows that worker investments in general training may not reach
the e¢cient amount because of credit market problems or contractual problems between
…rms and workers. But more important for Becker’s theory of training is the prediction
that …rms should never invest in the general skills of their employees. How successful is
this prediction? Firms very often invest in the skills of their employees. The standard
theory explains the training investments we observe in practice either by pointing out
that the skills are speci…c, or by arguing that the workers are e¤ectively paying for these
investments by taking a wage lower than their productivity. A body of evidence, however,
questions the validity of this explanation.
First of all, while most skills may be industry speci…c, they are likely to be “general”
because typically there are many …rms in the same industry using similar technologies.
For example, the know-how to use a printing machine is of limited use outside the printing
industry, but …rms within the same industry would …nd such know-how very valuable.
Skills acquired in the course of a training program therefore can be speci…c only if they
relate to a technology or practice used solely in that …rm. Since most technologies and
practices are common across …rms, most skills acquired in training programs are likely to
be general. Therefore, the standard theory can explain the presence of training programs
only by arguing that workers are paying for the full costs of these programs.
And yet, there is evidence suggesting that in many instances of training programs the
content is general and …rms still bear a signi…cant fraction of the costs. Three studies
estimate the net cost of apprenticeship programs to employers in Germany. They survey
training …rms about their accounting costs and apprentice productivity to assess the
net cost of training. The most careful of these was conducted in 1991 by the Federal
Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut fur Berufsbildung) and is described in
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the sum of the payroll costs of apprentices and training personnel, costs of material,
equipment, and structures used in the training, and direct costs of any external training
that the …rm pays for. In addition, the studies assess apprentice output, by surveying
supervisors about the jobs done by apprentices, and their productivity. A money measure
of the output contribution is constructed by multiplying the time spent in productive
activities with the payroll costs of a skilled worker and the relative apprentice productivity.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) survey the results of these studies and show that under a
variety of alternative assumptions, there are very substantial costs borne by employers
in these training investments. Overall, the evidence therefore suggests that even under
conservative assumptions, large German …rms bear a signi…cant …nancial cost in providing
general training to their apprentices. Similar studies exist for other countries. For
example, Ryan (1980) examined welder apprentices at a US shipyard, and Jones (1986)
looked at apprentices in British manufacturing. All of these studies …nd substantial net
costs for training apprentices.
There are also many examples of …rms that send their employees to college, MBA,
literacy programs, or problem solving courses, and pay for the expenses while the wages of
workers who take up these bene…ts are not reduced. In addition, many large companies,
such as consulting …rms, o¤er training programs to college graduates involving general
skills. These employers typically pay substantial salaries and bear the full monetary costs
of training, even during periods of full-time classroom training.
On the basis of these evidence, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,b) conclude that we
need to go beyond the simple models of training. They argue that only in imperfect
competitive labor markets …rms will have incentives to invest in the general skills of their
employees. I discuss this issue next.
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As noted above, noncompetitive elements are likely to be important in many labor mar-
kets. I argued, however, that these noncompetitive elements were unlikely to change many
of the insights of the supply-demand framework regarding the causes of the recent increase
inequality in the U.S.. In contrast, the presence of noncompetitive elements in the labor
market will change the incentives to invest in training radically.
To start with, let me consider Figure 8, and assume that wages are given by w(¿) as
drawn in the …gure. I continue to assume that all skills are general. The function w(¿)
speci…es the wage that the …rm has to pay a worker with training ¿.T h ek e yf e a t u r ei s
that wages are below the productivity of the worker, so the situation depicted in the …gure
is not consistent with a perfectly competitive labor market. Instead there are rents in the
employment relation accruing to the employer (i.e. there is some monopsony power). To
see why this is important for …rm-sponsored training, notice that if the …rm could never
pay a worker below his productivity, it could not recover the up-front costs of training
(see Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a for a detailed discussion of mechanisms that lead to
such rents).
The second and more important feature is that the wage function is increasing in the
level of training less steeply than productivity, so the gap between productivity and the
wage, ¢(¿), is higher at greater levels of skills. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) refer to
this type of wage structure as a compressed wage structure, since the return to skills for a
worker is less than the one prevailing in a competitive labor market. The gap between the
two curves in the …gure, denoted by ¢(¿), is the pro…t that the …rm makes from employing
the worker (gross of training costs, if any): its revenues are equal to f(¿),a n di t sc o s ti s
equal to the wage, w(¿). Therefore, with the wage function drawn in Figure 7, the …rm
prefers a more skilled worker to a less skilled one. This contrasts with the situation in
the perfectly competitive labor market where pro…ts from skilled and unskilled workers
were equal, i.e. ¢(¿)=0for all ¿, and so the …rm was indi¤erent regarding the skill level
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therefore want to invest in the skills of its employees so as to increase its pro…ts.
To see this more clearly, suppose that workers themselves cannot invest in training at
all. Then, inspection of Figure 8 shows that the …rm will provide and pay for training up
to ¿f > 0,g i v e nb yc0(¿f)=f0(¿f) ¡ w0(¿f). In other words, the …rm would choose the
level of training by setting the marginal change in the second period pro…t equal to the
marginal cost of training.
It is important to emphasize that, due to labor market imperfections and monopsony
power, workers are not being paid their full marginal product even though the skills are
general. So general skills are being rewarded as if they were (partly) speci…c. Labor
market imperfections therefore turn general skills into de facto speci…c skills.
Observe also that wage compression is necessary for …rm-sponsored training. Suppose
t h ew a g ef u n c t i o nw e r ew(¿)=f(¿) ¡ ¢ as drawn by the dashed line in Figure 7. In
this case, in contrast to a perfectly competitive labor market, the worker is paid less than
his productivity, so there are rents and monopsony power. But because the gap between
productivity and the wage is independent of the skill level of the worker, the …rm has no
interest in increasing the worker’s skills, and there is no …rm-sponsored training.
Why is it useful to contrast competitive and noncompetitive models of labor markets
in a discussion of training investments? In addition to challenging the prediction that
…rms should never invest in the general training of their employees, models of training
with imperfect labor markets make a very di¤erent prediction from the Becker model. In
the Becker model, the worker is the residual claimant of the returns from investment in
general training. Therefore, the forces shaping investment in general training should be
very similar to those a¤ecting education decisions. In particular, greater returns to train-
ing, in the form of higher wages for trained workers, should encourage further training.
Perhaps at …rst paradoxically, models with imperfect labor markets make a very di¤erent
prediction. When …rms undertake investments in general training, as is often the case,
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future production), the greater are the incentives of …rms to invest in training. In other
words, when trained workers are paid less, wages will be more compressed, and as a result,
…rms will have greater incentives to invest in training.
This contrast between competitive and noncompetitive models of the labor market is
important in a discussion of how to reduce inequality. As pointed out before, a direct way
of reducing earnings inequality is by legislating policies that induce wage compression
(minimum wages, for example). Many economists fear the adverse allocational e¤ects
of these policies, and Becker’s theory of training also suggests that these policies will
discourage further investments in human capital. The scorecard for these policies therefore
appears very negative. However, in the presence of noncompetitive labor markets, these
policies may in fact encourage investments in training, and be therefore much less costly
than often perceived.
What is the evidence on the relationship between wage compression and training?
There is no clear consensus, in part because we do not know how to measure wage com-
pression. The concept of wage compression refers to di¤erences between wages relative
to marginal product. Since marginal productivities of workers are not observed, wage
compression is also not observed. Therefore, investigations of this question have to rely
on proxies for wage compression. I will discuss three types of evidence of this sort. First,
minimum wages directly compress the wage structure, so we could look at the relation-
ship between training and minimum wages. Second, as pointed out above, unions often
compress the structure of wages, so we can look at the e¤ect of unions on training invest-
ments. Finally, there is a general consensus that the degree of wage compression varies
across countries because of di¤erences in labor market institutions. So we can also study
the cross-country relationship between returns to skill and training.
Part of the literature investigating the impact of minimum wages on training in the
U.S. focused on whether minimum wage laws lead to slower observed wage growth in micro
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on training investments, because training investments will increase the productivity and
therefore the wages of workers later in their careers. A steeper age-earnings pro…le can
therefore be interpreted as corresponding to more investment in training. Both Leighton
and Mincer (1981) and Hashimoto (1982) have found this to be the case and concluded
that minimum wage laws lead to less training. This evidence on wage growth does not
necessarily imply that less training takes place, however. Since minimum wages cut the
lower tail of the wage distribution, and typically create a spike at the minimum, they
would appear to reduce the slope of age-earnings pro…les even when they have no e¤ect
on training. In fact, in the presence of noncompetitive elements in the labor market, even
though minimum wages may increase training, they unambiguously reduce the slope of
age-earnings pro…les. Grossberg and Sicilian (1997), for example, …nd no e¤ect of min-
imum wages on training, but still …nd lower wage growth for minimum wage workers.
Furthermore, Card and Krueger (1995) compared cross sectional wage pro…les in Califor-
nia before and after the 1988 minimum wage increase with a number of control states.
They also found ‡atter pro…les in California after the minimum wage increase. However,
they point out that the Californian pro…le also shifts up and does not cross the previous
age-wage pro…le, which is inconsistent with the competitive theory, and accords well with
the predictions of non-competitive theories.
Given the di¢culty of interpreting changes in the slope of wage pro…les, it is more
compelling to look at the impact of minimum wages on training directly. Leighton and
Mincer (1981) use worker reported data on the receipt of training from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamic (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey. They …nd that workers
in states with more binding minimum wages receive signi…cantly less training. Cross
state comparisons may be confounded by the presence of other state e¤ects, however.
For example, industrial and occupational composition of employment varies substantially
across states, and di¤erent industries and occupations have di¤erent skill requirements.
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(1994) reports a similar …nding using later data from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) by comparing the training incidence of minimum wage workers with
those earning higher wages. The evidence from this study is even harder to interpret
because worker traits which lead to higher pay are typically also associated with more
training. Grossberg and Sicilian (1997) use the Employment Opportunities Pilot Project
(EOPP) data and compare minimum wage workers both to workers earning slightly less
and slightly more, ameliorating the problem of worker heterogeneity somewhat. They …nd
insigni…cant negative e¤ects on training for male minimum wage workers and insigni…cant
positive e¤ects for women.
Some of these problems are overcome by Neumark and Wascher (1998), who use
Current Population Survey (CPS) supplements to compare the impact of minimum wages
on training within states using comparisons of young workers in 1991 with older workers
(who are unlikely to be a¤ected by the minimum wage) and with young workers in 1983.
These comparisons assume that state di¤erences in training levels over long periods are
the same for younger and older workers or over long time periods, which is a stringent
requirement. They …nd negative e¤ects of minimum wages on training, which seem to be
too large, especially since not all young workers are a¤ected by the minimum wage. This
suggests that the …xed e¤ects assumptions is suspect.
Acemoglu and Pischke (2000) analyze the e¤ect of minimum wage increases on worker
training using the NLSY for the period 1987 to 1992. This period encompasses a number
of state minimum wage increases as well as two hikes in the federal minimum wage in
1990 and 1991. The federal increases had very di¤erent impacts on low skilled workers in
high and low wage states (Card (1992)). Thus, this analysis uses within state variation
in minimum wages for a homogeneous group of workers. Acemoglu and Pischke …nd no
evidence of a reduction in training in response to minimum wages. On the contrary, most
of their estimates show that higher minimum wages are associated with somewhat greater
72training incidents, though these e¤ects are typically not statistically signi…cant. Zero
or small positive e¤ects of minimum wages on training investments for workers near the
minimum wage are inconsistent with the standard theory of human capital, while they
are what non-competitive theories predict.
The evidence on the impact of unions on training is mixed. Many studies look directly
at the impact of unions on training. Duncan and Sta¤ord (1980) use the PSID, Lillard
and Tan (1992) use the CPS, and Barron, Fuess, and Loewenstein (1987) use the EOPP
and …nd negative e¤ects of union status on training. Barron, Berger, and Black (1997), on
the other hand, report insigni…cant union e¤ects using the EOPP data and …nd positive
e¤ects for formal training in the SBA data. Lynch (1992) also …nds positive e¤ects for
formal training in the NLSY (National Longitudinal Study of Youth). For the UK, Booth
(1991) reports more training for union workers, and Green (1993) …nds more training for
unionized workers in small establishments but not in large establishments. Overall, this
evidence does not give strong support either to competitive or non-competitive theories.
It is also useful to look at the relation between returns to skill and training across
countries which have di¤erent wage structures. In the mid 1980s, the log di¤erence of
n i n e t i e t ha n dt e n t hp e r c e n t i l ew a g e sw a s1 . 7 3i nt h eU Sa n d1 . 1 1i nt h eU Ka so p p o s e d
to 0.83 in Germany, 0.67 in Sweden, 1.22 in France and 1.01 in Japan (OECD (1993)).
These di¤erences in wage structures suggest that returns to training are also likely to
be compressed in Germany, France, Sweden and Japan as compared to the US and the
UK. In line with the predictions of the non-competitive theories, the incidence of company
provided formal training appears to be higher in Europe and Japan than in the US: OECD
(1994, Table 4.7) reports that 23.6 percent of young workers in France, 71.5 percent of
those in Germany and 67.1 percent of new hires in Japan receive formal training. By
way of comparison, only 10.2 percent of US workers receive any formal training during
their …rst seven years of labor market experience. However, comparisons of training levels
across countries are di¢cult because the data are collected using di¤erent methods, and
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level of training in di¤erent countries is the observation that …rms seem to be more likely
to bear the costs of general training in Europe than in the US. In Germany, vocational
skills are typically learned in apprenticeships and as pointed out above, large …rms have
sizable net costs for this type of training. Comparable skills are more often learned in
community colleges and vocational schools in the in the US, and paid for by the trainees
themselves. This pattern is in line with the predictions of the non-competitive theories.
5.6 Market Failures in Training?
In this section, I discuss the policy implications of the non-competitive theories of training
outlined so far. Although our state of knowledge is not advanced enough to make precise
policy recommendations, a brief discussion of whether the amount of training achieved by
the market economy is likely to be e¢cient is useful.
Recall that in the standard theory of human capital, training investments are e¢cient
if workers are not liquidity constrained. In this theory, government intervention is often
unnecessary, and should be mostly limited to improving loan markets. In fact, subsidies
to training would be counterproductive when the degree of liquidity constraints varies
across workers, because with subsidies, workers who are not liquidity constrained will
invest more than the e¢cient amount due to the lower marginal cost of investment.
A theory based on noncompetitive labor markets leads to two di¤erent conclusions.
First, even when workers are severely liquidity constrained, the amount of training may
not be as low as predicted by Becker’s theory, because …rms would undertake some of
the general training investments. Second, and more important, even when workers are
unconstrained, the amount of training is likely to fall well short of the …rst-best level of
investment.
The …rst source of underinvestment arises simply because with a compressed wage
structure, both …rms and workers share the bene…ts of increased productivity, and each
74may fail to internalize the e¤ect on its partner. This ine¢ciency can be overcome if the
worker and the …rm can write employment contracts which specify both the wage and the
training level in advance.
Nevertheless, there is another externality which remains operative even in this case.
This externality arises because general training in non-competitive labor markets often
bene…ts future employers. In contrast to competitive labor markets where future em-
ployers pay the full marginal product of workers, in a labor markets with a compressed
wage structure, a new employer would also make higher pro…ts from employing a more
skilled worker. I developed this argument in Acemoglu (1997) and showed that even when
workers have access to perfect loan markets and there are no contractual problems, the
amount of training in an imperfect labor market will be suboptimally low. If the source
of market failure in training is the positive externalities on future employers, the policy
remedies of the standard theory would be of no bene…t.
5.7 Concluding Comments
This part of the report surveyed key determinants of the incentives to invest in education
and training. In both cases, costs and bene…ts of these investments are essential for under-
standing who will invest in human capital and how much investment will be undertaken.
I emphasized the di¤erences between education and training investments, and how the
presence of labor market imperfections could change incentives to invest in training.
The following points may be useful to reiterate:
1. Education decisions are a¤ected by returns to education and costs of education.
Greater returns should increase education investments. In practice, this e¤ect seems
to be relatively small. Combined with the conclusion above that increases in the
relative supply of skills will only have a slow e¤ect on inequality, this suggests that
there is relatively little room for an increase in inequality to self-correct itself in the
near future.
752. Costs of education will also matter for education decisions. These costs comprise of
tuition costs, foregone earnings and nonpecuniary costs, determined by family and
peer groups. How the …nancial costs feature in the calculations of individuals and
families will also depend on credit market problems. In the presence of credit market
imperfections, individuals cannot borrow in order to smooth their consumption, and
the perceived costs of education will be much higher.
3. When labor markets are perfectly competitive, training decisions are shaped by
similar forces. Individuals will invest more when returns are large, and when costs,
for example in terms of forgone earnings or consumption smoothing, are small.
4. However, the fact that training investments are made jointly by workers and …rms
complicates the analysis. For example, when there are contractual problems between
…rms and workers, so that …rms cannot commit not to minimize the training time
of the workers in order to increase their production, training investments may be
severely curtailed.
5. When labor markets are imperfectly competitive, …rms may have a greater incentive
to invest in the training of their employees. In this case, what matters are the re-
turns for …rms, not for workers. A more compressed wage structure, which rewards
trained/skilled workers relatively less than their skills, may actually encourage fur-
ther investment in training, because it increases the returns to …rms from raising
the productivity of their employees.
6. There are many types of market failures in both education and training. Most
important, credit market problems will cause underinvestment in both types of
investments. Evidence suggests that such credit market problems are present. There
can also be other reasons for underinvestment, for example signaling or human
capital externalities, but the extent of these problems appears more limited.
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776 Policies to Reduce Inequality
The previous three parts of the report laid out the key determinants of inequality and
reviewed the theory of human capital investments. We are now in a position to discuss
policies. Although human capital policies, which encourage further investment in human
capital, are the central focus of this report, I start with other policies that could be useful
in reducing inequality, and then turn to human capital policies.
At this juncture, it is also useful to highlight what features of the New Zealand economy
and society will be important in thinking about the relative e¢cacy of these di¤erent
policies. In particular, the following questions are relevant in thinking about the New
Zealand case:
1. How does the New Zealand economy compare to the U.S., Australia, and Canada,
in terms of worker skills? Much of the evidence is from the U.S., where there is
relatively little shortage of skills. It is plausible to think that human capital policies
may be more e¤ective if there are more serious skill shortages in New Zealand than
in these other countries.
2. Is there a shortage of key skilled personnel, such as engineers and managers, nec-
essary for the absorption of advances in frontier technology? Shortage of speci…c
types of skills may have a large e¤ect on inequality by increasing the pay of certain
workers, and what type of shortages there are is clearly very relevant for the types
of policies that need to be considered.
3. Is human capital rewarded appropriately? For example, what is the return to ed-
ucation in New Zealand relative to other comparable countries? Since the rate of
return to education in New Zealand appears to be higher than in other compara-
ble countries, wage compression policies may not have substantial costs in terms of
discouraging education.
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What types of human capital (more speci…c, general, abstract skills) are in shorter
supply?
5. How important is international trade in a¤ecting the labor market in New Zealand
compared to the U.S. or Canada? In a more open economy, the e¤ect of changes in
supply of skills on skill prices and inequality will be even more limited.
6. What is the sectoral composition of production in New Zealand? How far behind
the U.S. is the New Zealand economy in the share high tech industries, such as o¢ce
and computing equipment, producer durables, medical technologies and chemicals?
These are the sectors that are generally thought to generate a large demand for
skills. If a large increase in the share of production of these sectors is expected in
New Zealand, demand for skills and inequality may increase further.
7. In which respects do the current programs in New Zealand fall short of encouraging
human capital accumulation?
8. What is the structure of redistributive taxation in New Zealand economy at the
moment?
9. What type of policies encouraging wage compression are there in New Zealand, and
how e¤ective are they?
I will brie‡y mention the speci…c context for New Zealand in the discussion of some
of the policies, but a much more detailed knowledge of the New Zealand economy and
society is necessary for a more complete evaluation of these programs.
6.1 Wage Compression
Inducing a compression in the wage structure in the private sector is a direct way of
reducing inequality. Government intervention could induce wage compression through a
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the imposition of the minimum wage. The minimum wage forces employers to pay higher
wages to low-paid workers, and many economists also believe that it creates spillover ef-
fects, causing a compression of wages even among workers who were not directly a¤ected
by the minimum wage (i.e., those who were previously paid above the minimum wage).
Much evidence suggests that minimum wages do have a substantial e¤ect on the distri-
bution of wages. For the U.S., such evidence has been presented by DiNardo, Fortin and
Lemieux (1995) and Lee (1999). Both studies …nd that the erosion of the real value of
minimum wage in the U.S. due to in‡ation during the 1980s led to a substantial increase
in wage dispersion at the bottom of the distribution, and the subsequent increase in the
minimum wage during 1990-91 led to a compression. Other policies that can induce wage
compression include unemployment bene…ts, which are by their nature progressive (i.e.,
they o¤er a greater replacement rate to lower paid workers), and policies that encourage
union bargaining.
Many economists are against such policies for a variety of reasons. These reasons can
be classi…ed into two groups. First, many suspect that wage compression will discourage
human capital investments. The reasoning for this has already been discussed; wage
compression reduces returns to skill, and may reduce the incentives to invest in further
human capital accumulation. Second, many economists believe that wage compression,
by increasing the cost of employing low skill workers, may cause higher unemployment
among low skill workers.
Both of these concerns are important, and to some degree valid. However, their
importance can be exaggerated as well. As discussed in the previous part of the report, the
extent to which wage compression reduces investments in human capital may be limited.
First, in the case of education, there is little conclusive evidence that lower returns to
education discourage schooling (or higher returns encourage schooling). Second, in the
case of training, wage compression may actually encourage further investment by …rms.
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there is certainly no evidence that moderate wage compression has a very negative e¤ect
on training investments. I therefore conclude that the negative e¤ects of wage compression
on human capital investments may be rather limited.
It should also be noted that wage compression type policies may encourage the creation
of more good jobs. The argument has already been raised above in Part 4, but it is useful
to reiterate it here. Wage compression policies imply that …rms will have to pay high
wages to their employees. Once they realize that they will pay higher wages, it makes more
sense for the employers to increase the productivity of the workers. Previously (i.e., before
wage compression), bad jobs paid low wages and were also less productive. Nevertheless,
they may have been pro…table for employers because of the lower wages. However, once
employers are forced to pay higher wages even in these low productivity jobs, they may
opt for higher productivity jobs. In Acemoglu (2001), I demonstrated that this argument
applies quite generally, and also provided empirical evidence suggesting that increases in
minimum wages and unemployment bene…ts shift the distribution of employment from
low-wage occupations towards high-wage occupations.
What about the negative e¤ects of wage compression on the employment prospects of
low skill workers? Here too, the consensus among economists is changing. Although many
economists still believe that minimum wages and other policies that increase the costs of
employing low skill workers will be very detrimental to employment, recent evidence chal-
lenges this view. Card and Krueger (1995) provide a variety of evidence showing that in
the U.S. increases in minimum wages did not have a negative e¤ect on the employment
prospects of teenage workers or other low skill workers. They look at cross-state evidence,
time series evidence, changes in policies across states, and the imposition of the federal
minimum wage in 1990-91. In neither case do they …nd strong evidence that minimum
wages reduced employment. In fact, they show that many previous results showing such
negative e¤ects are fragile, and in most of their estimates, there is a positive associa-
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has been presented for other countries by Machin and Manning (1996) and others. We
should be cautious in interpreting the positive association, which is likely to re‡ect im-
precise estimates or other factors (some economists have tried to justify such positive
association using monopsony model of the labor market, but I do not …nd this necessarily
compelling). Overall the evidence from the U.S. and other OECD countries suggests that
the disemployment e¤ect of minimum wages is likely to be limited.
Similarly, unemployment bene…ts are likely to discourage workers from …nding jobs
and perhaps encourage them to demand higher wages. Nevertheless, existing evidence
suggests that disemployment e¤ects of unemployment bene…ts are also limited. For ex-
ample, Meyer (1995) …nds that a 10 percent increase in unemployment bene…ts raises
unemployment duration by about a week, while Ehrenberg and Oxaca (1978) and Atkin-
son and Mickelright (1991) estimate a slightly smaller response. These are relatively small
e¤ects on unemployment.
What about cross-country comparisons? This is important because a famous thesis,
often attributed to Krugman (1994), explains high unemployment in Europe as a result of
wage compression there (see also OECD, 1994). According to this theory, and as argued
in Part 3 of this report, the past 30 years have experienced rapid skill-biased technical
change. This skill-biased technical change led to an increase inequality in the relatively
competitive labor market of the U.S.. In contrast, the labor market institutions of Europe
prevented the increase in wage inequality, instead raising the amount of wage compression.
This wage compression lead to an increase in unemployment. If this conclusion is correct,
it points to a very signi…cant cost of wage compression policies
The view that wages are more compressed in Europe clearly has some merit. Blau and
Kahn (1996) show that the major di¤erence in overall inequality between the U.S. and
many continental European economies is not in the 90-50 di¤erential, but in the 50-10
di¤erential. This suggests that the minimum wage, strong unions, and generous transfer
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Despite its intuitive appeal, the Krugman hypothesis runs into two di¢culties. First,
unless there are extremely rigid institutions that …x the skill premium exogenously, skill-
biased technical change should increase wage inequality irrespective of the degree of exoge-
nously imposed wage compression. In contrast, in many continental European economies,
most notably in Germany, wage inequality was very stable (see, e.g., Freeman and Katz,
1995).
Second, the Krugman hypothesis makes an explicit prediction: to the extent that
wage compression is preventing the increase in the inequality of wages, pro…t maximizing
employment decisions of …rms should lead to a large decline in the employment of unskilled
workers relative to that of skilled workers. In fact, skill-biased technical change might
even reduce the unemployment rates of skilled workers. Yet, in Europe, the unemployment
of skilled and unskilled workers increased together (e.g. Nickell and Bell, 1996, Krueger
and Pischke, 1997), and unskilled employment did not grow faster in the U.S. than in
European economies (Card, Kramartz and Lemieux, 1996, Krueger and Pischke, 1997).
It is possible that bargaining arrangements in Europe between …rms and unions lead
not only to wage compression, but also to deviations from the relative demand curve for
skills shown Figure 1. This can be because European institutions may be forcing …rms to
pay uniform wages to all educated workers irrespective of their exact contribution, making
the employment of skilled workers less pro…table as well. Alternatively, if unions represent
both skilled and unskilled workers, and are committed to wage compression, they may
not want to su¤er a large decrease in the employment of unskilled workers. So they may
be willing to make certain concessions in wage levels in order to induce …rms to employ
more unskilled workers at a compressed wage structure. Although such deviations from
the relative demand curve drawn in Figure 1 are a possibility, we have no direct evidence
to assess how far o¤ the relative demand curve European economies may be, and how
they would respond to skill-biased technical change in this situation.
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aging human capital investments and employment declines may have been exaggerated.
Therefore, moderate wage compression policies may be a useful tool in reducing inequal-
ity. However, there is still quite a lot of uncertainty about the e¤ects of wage compression
policies, so care must be taken. Although the existing evidence on the e¤ects of wage
compression policies is mixed, it is not inconceivable that wage compression policies may
have adverse long run e¤ects. This suggests that only very moderate wage compression
policies should be used.
In the New Zealand case, the minimum wage appears to be somewhat more generous
than in the U.S.. This suggests that a further increase in the minimum wage, or other
wage compression policies, may be undesirable. In that case, perhaps the implication of
this discussion is not to encourage further wage compression policies, but to raise serious
caution in regards to policies that are designed to dismantle existing wage compression
policies. Dismantling of such policies during a period of already increasing wage dispersion
could amplify the increase in inequality, with little bene…t in terms of increased human
capital investments or employment.
6.2 Redistributive Taxation
Redistributive taxation is an attractive policy to reduce income inequality. As discussed
in the previous section, policies that directly compress the structure of wages may have
some adverse e¤ects, such as reducing the employment of low-paid workers. Redistributive
taxation would avoid such costs. On the contrary, if a given tax system becomes more
redistributive, without increasing the overall tax burden, it would increase the marginal
return to working for low-pay workers.
Nevertheless, many economists are cautious about redistributive policies because they
may have disincentive e¤ects. The presumption is that a higher tax rate will discourage
higher e¤ort or reduce working hours. With redistributive taxation, high taxes fall speci…-
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that such a policy may reduce business creation.
The predictions of economic theory on the e¤ects of redistributive taxation are am-
biguous, however. Everything else equal, a higher tax rate reduces working hours and
e¤ort. This is the usual substitution e¤ect in economics. Yet there is also an income
e¤ect counteracting this. A higher tax rate reduces the individual’s disposable income,
and forces him to consume less of all normal goods (i.e., less of all goods that have a
positive income elasticity). Since leisure is a normal good, this implies that the income
e¤ect created by a higher tax rate will encourage greater working hours and more e¤ort.
Therefore, the implications of redistributive taxation on the work incentives of the rich is
an empirical matter. Clearly, very high marginal rates, for example rates over 70 or 80%,
will have serious disincentive e¤ects. The implications of moderately high marginal tax
rate on the rich are unclear.
There is a large U.S. literature estimating how incomes change in response to increases
in tax rates. Although there are estimates that show large e¤ects, the majority of estimates
show small responses. A large portion of this literature is surveyed by Pencavel (1986).
He concludes that the elasticity of hours of work to changes in tax rates is close to
zero. More recently, some authors have estimated large e¤ects of the cuts of the tax
rates for high income brackets during the 1980s on the pre-tax incomes of high income
individuals (e.g., Feldstein, 1995). However, these tax cuts took place during a period of
already widening income inequality, and these estimates do not control for other factors
increasing the gap of incomes between middle and high income individuals. Moreover,
these tax cuts changed incentives for reporting taxable income, in particular the incentives
for shifting labor income to capital income (or corporate income). So measured incomes
of high-income individuals will re‡ect these changes as well.
Therefore, I conclude that moderate redistributive taxation in the U.S. context is
unlikely to have had large disincentive e¤ects, and could be a useful tool in reducing
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Another adverse consequence of redistributive taxation has been pointed out by Heck-
man, Lochner and Taber (1998). They argue that redistributive taxation, by reducing
the net return to schooling, may discourage human capital investments. Lower average
human capital investments may then act to increase skill premia and inequality. Although
this argument is theoretically correct, the discussion in Parts 3 and 5 suggests that its
empirical importance is limited. First, the impact of changes in average human capital
on skill prices is likely to be small. Secondly, there is little evidence that individuals
respond to net returns to schooling strongly in their human capital investment decisions.
I therefore conclude that a moderate amount of redistributive taxation could be useful in
reducing post-tax income inequality.
Nevertheless, it is di¢cult to apply the U.S. evidence to New Zealand. There are a
number of distinctive features of the New Zealand economy which may have an important
bearing on how redistributive taxation will in‡uence economic activity. First, high earning
individuals in New Zealand may outmigrate with relative ease to Australia. In contrast,
such migration opportunities from the U.S. to other countries are limited. The possibility
of migration by high wage individuals increases the danger that redistributive policies may
have adverse consequences. Second, there are major di¤erences in the structure of taxes
between New Zealand and the U.S.. In particular, taxes are already more progressive
in New Zealand, and the structure of indirect taxation is di¤erent. Therefore, before
an increase in redistributive taxation, a careful assessment of the tax elasticity of labor
supply and migration rates by high earners is necessary.
6.3 Human Capital Policies
I now turn to the discussion of human capital policies narrowly de…ned, that is, policies
that explicitly target human capital investments. I will discuss the following human
capital policies:
861. general subsidies to higher education that reduce costs of higher education for all
individuals;
2. means-tested subsidies to higher education, including partly need-based scholar-
ships, that reduce higher education costs speci…cally for lower income individuals;
3. speci…c tuition waivers and aid for selective majors;
4. increasing availability of credit to be used for education purposes;
5. policies directed at secondary schooling, including those speci…cally encouraging
secondary schooling for lower income families;
6. voucher type programs encouraging school choice;
7. policies encouraging on-the-job training.
8. “work …rst” policies encouraging welfare recipients and other individuals out of the
labor force to obtain jobs …rst, as a pathway to human capital accumulation;
9. policies that encourage pre-school education for children from disadvantaged fami-
lies.
Before discussing these policies, it is useful to reiterate the broad conclusions reached
so far. Increasing average human capital in the economy is unlikely to have a large e¤ect
on inequality, at least not in the near future. This implies that the most pressing objective
of human capital policies should be to close the skill gap between the top and the bottom
of the wage distribution.
6.3.1 The e¤ect of subsidies to higher education
One of the most common human capital policies is direct subsidies to higher education.
Most OECD economies subsidize the university system. The reasoning for this type
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enrollments in colleges. Therefore subsidies that reduce tuition costs should increase
college enrollments. The available evidence supports this presumption.
There is a large literature attempting to uncover the e¤ect of tuition costs on enroll-
ments. McPherson and Schapiro (1991) and Leslie and Brinkman (1988) review various
studies showing that costs of attending college matter. The consensus estimate seems to
be that a $1000 decline in net price of college (tuition minus aid) is associated with a 5
percentage point increase in the college attendance of the target group. This amounts
to a sizable elasticity, and shows that such policies could be quite e¤ective. Many of the
studies surveyed by these authors, however, look at the e¤ect of aid rather than tuition
costs. In most simple models, what should matter is the net price of college attendance,
but some studies …nd that the e¤ects of aid and tuition costs may di¤er. For this reason,
it is useful to look at studies that only focus on tuition costs. A recent study by Kane
(1995) uses the National Educational Longitudinal Survey of 1988 to examine how tuition
in public universities a¤ects college attendance. He …nds that a $1000 increase in tuition
reduces the attendance rate by about 5 percentage points. Perhaps more interestingly, he
…nds that the e¤ect is larger on youth from lower income families (7.2 percentage points as
compared to the e¤ect on middle and upper-income youth which is about 4.4 percentage
points).
So are subsidies to higher education an e¤ective tool to reduce inequality? I believe
t h ea n s w e rt ob en o . T h e r ea r ean u m b e ro fp r o b l e m sw i t hg e n e r a ls u b s i d i e st oc o l l e g e
education.
1. The most important is that such subsidies are very costly, because they are subsi-
dizing not only marginal agents—i.e., students who would not have attended college
in the absence of such subsidies—, but also intramarginal agents—i.e., students who
would have attended college anyway. This clearly increases the costs of running such
subsidy programs. For example, to achieve a 5 percentage point increase in college
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college. This will clearly amount to a very large sum. Moreover since intramarginal
students are often from middle and upper income families, such subsidies often ben-
e…t middle and upper-income families. This problem is made worse when one takes
into account that even in the presence of subsidies, the majority of the students
attend college are from middle and upper-income background. Therefore, direct
subsidies to higher education are quite regressive in nature, bene…ting the richer
segments of the society.
2. The second problem with such subsidies is that their e¤ect may be rather limited.
As discussed in Part 3 the e¤ect of an increase in average human capital of skill
prices will be small. Therefore, any human capital policy to be e¤ective in reducing
inequality has to close the skill gap between the top and bottom of the distribution.
Such subsidies will provide only little help to those who are truly at the bottom of the
skill distribution, since even in the presence of subsidies the students contemplating
college attendance are relatively high skill, for example, they would never be at
the bottom 10 percent of the wage distribution. On the contrary, such policies
may encourage further education by individuals already at the top of the income
distribution, widening the gap even further. Therefore, although such policies may
be useful in closing the gap between the top of the income distribution and the
middle, they will not be very useful in closing the gap between the bottom and the
top.
6.3.2 Means-tested subsidies to higher education
Instead of general subsidies to higher education that bene…t all families sending their
children to college, means-tested policies, such as need-based scholarships, are much more
e¤ective. They will be more cost-e¤ective because they will subsidize fewer intramarginal
households. Moreover, they will more explicitly target families from the lower end of the
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means-tested) to achieve such a goal. Although these policies would still not deal with the
second problem raised above (i.e. the fact that policies that encourage higher education
will not help individuals at the bottom of the distribution), they are likely to be successful
in increasing college enrollments.
Another argument in favor of such policies is that the evidence suggesting that this
type of aid matters for college attendance is in fact much more convincing than that related
to the e¤ect of tuition costs. This is because a number of recent studies have exploited
natural variation in aid in the U.S. to provide convincing estimates. For example Angrist
(1993) analyzes the impact of veterans educational bene…ts on schooling. In the late 1970s,
veterans bene…ts were quite generous. Angrist exploits time series variation in program
generosity and …nd that these educational bene…ts had a large e¤ect on enrollments and
completed schooling. Dynarski (1998) looks at the e¤ect of the elimination of Social
Security students bene…t program in 1982. This program had subsidized a large number of
college students who were children of dead, disabled or retired Social Security bene…ciaries.
Dynarski looks at the e¤ect of this program by comparing the change in the enrollments
of students who were previously eligible and those who were never eligible. She also …nd
a large e¤ect of this type of aid on enrollments (approximately, a $1000 increase in grant
aid raising college attendance by 4.2 percentage points). A …nal bene…t of this type of aid
is that it does not need to be simply means-tested and can be targeted to very speci…c
groups, such as certain disadvantaged demographic groups or minorities.
I therefore view means-tested subsidies to college as an e¤ective policy that will in-
crease the earnings of some otherwise disadvantaged youth. However for the reasons
raised in the previous subsection, this policy is unlikely to increase the earnings of the
individuals at the bottom of the distribution, so it needs to be supplanted with other
policies to close the gap between the top and the bottom of the distribution.
906.3.3 Speci…c tuition waivers or aid for selective majors
These refer to policies that try to target speci…c majors, or speci…c occupations to receive
more grant or aid. The underlying reasoning for such policies would be that the govern-
ment may have a better sense of what areas will face shortages in the future. Although
there can be an argument in favor of this point of view, there are too many pitfalls.
It is likely that the government will decide which majors or …elds to subsidize by looking
at recent experience, and will have less information than individuals. Moreover, just
subsidizing speci…c majors without monitoring what is being taught may be ine¤ective:
if individuals did not want to take these majors, colleges would have to cater to these
needs, and they would simply change the names of the …elds they teach, but not the
instruction. Therefore such policies would involve heavy regulation, and are likely to be
counterproductive. I conclude that such policies are not very attractive.
6.3.4 Increasing the availability of educational loans
If the reason why individuals do not invest enough in education is credit market problems,
the most e¤ective tool to deal with this may be increasing the availability of educational
loans. The attraction of this policy compared to direct subsidies is that if there is al-
ready too much subsidy to education or if credit market problems are not severe, further
subsidies may distort the allocation of resources (see the discussion in Part 5 above).
In contrast, just increasing the availability of educational loans would not create a large
distortion. Therefore, this type of policy appears attractive.
One issue needs to be borne in mind, however. The government may want to use human
capital policies not simply to correct underinvestment in education, but to encourage more
education than the e¢cient amount, because it cares about the distribution of income.
In this case, educational loans may be less attractive than means-tested aid or direct
subsidies.
I conclude that educational loans are useful policies, and should probably be used in
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6.3.5 Policies directed at secondary schooling
Perhaps the biggest challenge for human capital policies is to close the gap between the
top and the bottom of the distribution. Policies that encourage college attendance cannot
achieve this, since individuals at the bottom of the distribution are unlikely to take ad-
vantage of these programs. This suggests that policies that directly subsidize secondary
schooling, in particular, those that increase the quality of the secondary schooling that
children from disadvantaged backgrounds receive may be very useful. Although such poli-
cies are likely to help those who will be in the bottom quartile of the earnings distribution,
it is useful to note that this point that they are unlikely to help all of those in the bottom
quartile. Policies directed at improving the cognitive skills of low achievers will still leave
some students with low achievement, and may not close the gap between the very top and
the very bottom of the income distribution (say the gap between the 90 percentile and the
bottom one or two percentiles). This may be a particularly important concern if there are
many youths from poor backgrounds, with inadequate preparation for school, and likely to
engage in risky behavior, including substance abuse, and a tendency to dropout of school.
General policies increasing the quality of secondary schooling are unlikely to help students
with such special needs. Despite these shortcomings, policies directed at improving the
quality of secondary schooling are likely to help the overall dispersion, and less extreme
measures of achievement and earnings gap, such as the 90-10 earnings di¤erential or the
75-25 di¤erential.
Governments in all OECD economies already invest substantial amounts in secondary
schooling. Moreover, many economists believe that further increases in school resources
will have only marginal e¤ect on quality of schooling or the human capital that schools
provide students. This point of view is forcefully expressed by Hanushek (1996). Hanushek
argues that the very large increase in the amount of resources invested in schools in the
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On the contrary, in many dimensions American schools are doing worse today. He also
surveys a variety of studies that estimate the relationship between school resources, such
as class size, and student performance. He argues that there isn’t enough evidence from
the studies showing that school quality matters. Instead, Hanushek and others argue that
what is required is to improve incentives for teachers. According to this view, American
schools are performing badly because teachers are not given the proper incentives and are
not monitored to make sure that they work hard. So should we conclude that investing
further resources in secondary schooling is unlikely to improve the human capital of the
society?
Although Hanushek is likely to be correct in emphasizing the importance of teacher
incentives, his other conclusions have been challenged on a number of fronts. Many studies
may not …nd bene…cial e¤ects from class size, but this is likely to re‡ect the fact that many
schools allocate students with learning di¢culties or other problems to smaller classes,
such as special education students in the U.S.. In fact, studies that exploit more convincing
source of variation in class size or school quality …nd large e¤ects. For example, Card and
Krueger (1992) look at the e¤ect of higher school quality on the labor market outcomes in
the U.S., by exploiting cross state variation in school quality among all students or among
black students. They …nd sizable e¤ects of school quality on performance. Angrist and
Lavy (1999) provide evidence from Israel that exogenous di¤erences in class size have large
e¤ects on student achievement. Krueger (1999) provides evidence from an experimental
study in the U.S., showing signi…cant e¤ects of class size on performance. On balance,
it appears that larger classes are detrimental to learning, so further resources, especially
directed to poorer neighborhoods, may be useful.
Large classes or inexperienced teachers may not be the only problem facing children
from disadvantaged backgrounds. A common problem in the U.S. is that secondary schools
are highly segregated along income lines. Although there are a number of policies trying
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of segregation may be bad for inequality is as follows: learning at the secondary schooling
level is likely to be a team activity, in the sense that students learn from each other, and
perhaps imitate each other. Children from higher income families have more support from
their parents, and because of greater resources, they are likely to be in an advantageous
position. If all high income children segregated in their high income schools, they would
bene…t from each other’s advantages, while low income children would fail to bene…t from
the same forces. The problem becomes more serious if, as in many U.S. inner cities, low
income neighborhoods also lack attractive role models (e.g., adults or young adults who
project an image encouraging further education to teenagers). A policy that ensures that
children from low income families receive high-quality education, perhaps being mixed
with children from high income families, may be useful.
Nevertheless, such policies may have negative e¤ects as well, disrupting the decentral-
ized nature of schooling decisions, increasing commuting time for students who have to
go to schools far away from where they live etc. So whether such policies are desirable or
not is an empirical question.
A recent paper by Guryan (2000) looks at the e¤ect of the forced-integration of black
and white schools in the U.S.. Many of the issues of segregation along income lines that
are present today took the form of racial segregation in the ’70s. He …nds that this type of
integration had a highly bene…cial e¤ect on the high school dropout rates of black youth.
On the basis of this, it appears that such policies may have bene…cial e¤ects. Nevertheless,
given the high level of disruption that such policies may cause, a lot of caution is required,
and they should not be the policies at the top of the agenda.
Another important consideration is the distribution of achievement in high school.
Recent evidence suggests that there is a larger fraction of secondary school students in
Anglo-Saxon countries, including New Zealand, with serious problems in reading and math
(e.g. Elley, 1992). The students with low achievements are then likely to become the low
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can deal with these problems is unclear since these problems may have more deep rooted
social causes. Nevertheless, improving the quality of secondary schooling, especially for
the bottom tail of the achievement distribution, appears as a very promising policy option.
6.3.6 Vouchers
A policy currently in the U.S. agenda is a provision of schooling vouchers to enable
families, that would otherwise send their children to public schools, to send their children
to private schools. The motivation for this policy is that many public schools are thought
not to provide good education to low income families. More generally, some also argue
that public schools do not face any competition, and the introduction of vouchers would
also lead to improvements in public schools. A full discussion of the e¤ect of vouchers,
and other new school arrangements, is beyond the scope of this report. A previous report
prepared for the New Zealand Treasury by Nechyba (1998) discusses these issues in great
detail.
Here it su¢ces to say that evidence on the e¤ect of vouchers on performances mixed.
One of the most careful studies, Rouse (1998), …nds that they do have a bene…cial e¤ect on
students taking advantage of vouchers, but these e¤ects are relatively small. Nevertheless,
such policies may be a more limited interest in countries other than the U.S. where public
schools may be facing fewer problems. Moreover, the above discussion suggests that if
vouchers work by enabling greater segregation among a group of students from well-to-do
families, they may bene…t the students using vouchers, but equally hurt students who
are left behind. More important, vouchers may also be quite regressive, bene…ting higher
income families, and eventually reducing the political support for public schooling.
However, independent from the interest of vouchers for New Zealand, the general
principle that greater school choice may be bene…cial, as long as it does not lead to a
large amount of segregation across income lines, is useful to bear in mind.
956.3.7 Policies encouraging on-the-job training
The discussion in Part 5 showed that there is likely to be underinvestment in training.
This makes policies encouraging training potentially useful. More important for the focus
of this report, policies encouraging training are likely to be one of the most e¤ective
ways of reducing the skill gap between the top and the bottom of the distribution. This is
because, in contrast to policies encouraging college education, polices encouraging training
can help workers at the lower tail of the skill and earnings distribution. Workers with
no high school degree, or who are only high school graduates, can bene…t from acquiring
skills for a certain occupation, such as mechanics or carpentry, or in a given industry, such
as automobile manufacturing or banking. With such skills, their productivity and earning
capacity can be substantially higher, closing the skill and earnings gap in the society.
That such policies are e¤ective in reducing inequality is illustrated by the German
example. In contrast to the U.S. or the U.K., there is a widespread apprenticeship system
in Germany. A large fraction of youth who do not continue to college work in …rms
that simultaneously o¤er them training. Such apprenticeship programs typically last for
three years, and consist of both classroom learning and factory ‡oor training. Many
commentators argue that German workers with high school education or less, who have
b e e nt h r o u g hs u c ha p p r e n t i c e s h i pp r o g r a m s ,a r em u c hm o r es k i l l e dt h a nc o m p a r a b l eU . S .
workers (see, for example, Steedman, 1993, Franz and Soskice, 1995). In fact, while the
real earnings of workers with high school education or less fell sharply in the U.S. during
the 1980s, those of comparable workers in Germany increased. A likely explanation for
this is that the technological changes during the 1980s that the increased the demand
for skills hurt U.S. high school graduates who possessed relatively few skills, but not the
German high school graduates who had acquired considerable skills via apprenticeship
programs.
Although the German apprenticeship program is …nanced by employers themselves,
the government does play a substantial role. For example, it regulates classroom learning,
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industry, where high turnover makes …rm sponsored training impractical, the government
also subsidizes training.
This discussion suggests that policies encouraging training will be highly bene…cial and
e¤ective in reducing inequality. But what type of policies? There are three broad types
of policies that governments can pursue to encourage training: subsidies or tax credits
to …rms providing training to their employees, direct provision of training by government
agencies, and regulation of training programs o¤ered by …rms.
The most common remedy is subsidies. As long as there is underinvestment in training,
subsidies to training …rms or tax credits for on-the-job training would be bene…cial. Even
in the absence of underinvestment in training, such subsidies could increase the human
capital of workers at the bottom tail of the skills distribution in the society and serve to
reduce inequality.
One potential problem, however, is that when monitoring workplace training is dif-
…cult, subsidies may be relatively ine¤ective. For example, if the amount or quality of
training the …rm provides is non-contractible, then with or without subsidies, the …rm
will choose the same amount of training, and subsidies are simply a windfall gain to the
…rm.
An alternative to subsidies would be the direct provision of training by the govern-
ment. However, government training programs fail to exploit the complementarity be-
tween training and production and their curricula may lag behind the needs of businesses
and trainees. The US experience with subsidies and government run training programs
is rather mixed, suggesting that only expensive government programs are successful, see
e.g. Lalonde (1995).
This suggests that it may be necessary to supplement subsidies with regulation. Most
regulation, as in the case of the German apprenticeship system, monitors the quality of
training programs and certi…es skills. One e¤ect of regulation would be that it makes
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eliminate the externality that arises when training is decided non-cooperatively (see e.g.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)). Hence, regulation would allow workers to contribute to the
amount of training they receive, so it would be most useful when workers have some ability
to pay for training. With a similar argument, regulation would also complement the use
of subsidies by enabling the government to monitor whether a …rm receiving subsidies
is actually providing training. But it has to be born in mind that regulation could also
be counterproductive. For example, if other …rms’ uncertainty about the value of skills
acquired in a training program encourages initial employers to provide training because
employers would then be able to keep these workers, for example as in the model of Katz
and Ziderman (1990), certi…cation of the skills may reduce …rm-sponsored training. In
practice such counterproductive e¤ects are unlikely, especially in view of the fact that in
Germany government agencies certi…es skills acquired in apprenticeship programs.
Two additional considerations are important in thinking about policies that encourage
on-the-job training. First, such policies are very e¤ective in dealing with skill shortages
for speci…c industries or occupations. If shortage of engineers or quali…ed craftsmen is
an important constraint in New Zealand, training policies will be more useful both in
increasing output and reducing inequality. Second, there is an important question related
to the timing of human capital investments. Policies directed at secondary schooling
encourage more human capital at the earlier stages of a worker’s life (when he or she is a
teenager). Training policies, on the other hand, increase the human capital of the worker
later. Everything else equal, earlier policies may be preferred, but training policies have
important advantages. For example, workers and …rms can undertake such investments
after …nding out the exact comparative advantage and interests of the worker, or in what
areas further investment will have greater return. Although there is little evidence on this
topic, common sense suggests that a combination of early and later investments is likely
to be optimal to build lifetime skills for workers.
98Overall, policies encouraging training are likely to be quite e¤ective in reducing in-
equality. They may also be useful because there is likely to be underinvestment in training.
Among such policies, direct training provision by the government seems least appealing.
Although there is little empirical research on this topic, theoretical considerations suggest
that the best mix of policies is likely to be a combination of government subsidies or tax
credits for training and regulation to ensure the quality of the training programs.
6.3.8 Work-…rst policies
A serious problem for some workers is not simply low labor income, but lack of jobs. In
Europe unemployment is very high, and workers of di¤erent demographic characteristics
and education are among the unemployed. In contrast, in the U.S. workers facing dif-
…culty …nding jobs are concentrated among those with very few marketable skills. This
group includes workers with disabilities and welfare recipients (single mothers with low
education, especially minorities). A similar problem may exist in New Zealand with low
education individuals with Maori descent.
It has been argued that the most e¤ective way of dealing with the problem of very
low or zero earnings among such groups is to encourage employment …rst. Such workers
will not be able to get high paying jobs, so their employment must be in low-paid jobs
such as in the fast foods or retail sector. Given the discussion on the pitfalls of bad jobs
above, one may worry that such jobs may be dead end avenues for these workers.
Nevertheless, this conclusion needs to be quali…ed. The discussion regarding good
versus bad jobs above referred to workers with high labor market attachment (i.e., workers
who would not drop out of the labor market). Such workers will not be easily discouraged
when they cannot …nd a job, and if there are certain high wage jobs open to them, they
will eventually …nd those, and bene…t from both the higher wages and the greater human
capital accumulation opportunities o¤ered by these jobs.
The problem for the marginal groups, such as those with disabilities or welfare re-
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This weighs in favor of policies that provide jobs for these groups, even if these jobs are
low-paying. Another consideration in favor of this prescription is that a signi…cant compo-
nent of the human capital of a middle aged worker is his/her labor market experience. In
other words, workers who have spent more years in employment earn substantially higher
wages. In theory this could simply re‡ect age e¤ects, that is, the fact that older workers
are more productive. An interesting paper by Angrist (1991), however, shows that this
is more likely to re‡ect the productivity gains from labor market experience than simply
age. Angrist compares di¤erent cohorts that spend di¤erent amounts in the army, and
…nds that cohorts that spent longer in the army lost precisely the amount that would
have accrued to them as a result of these additional years of experience. This evidence
suggests that there may be considerable gains from labor market experience.
In view of this, encouraging groups with low attachment to the labor force to …nd jobs
appears as a useful policy. It will increase their immediate earnings, and likely contribute
to their future earnings. However, since the jobs they can get, without much subsidy or
further training, are likely to be very low-pay, policies that subsidize their employment
are likely to be highly complementary. For example, a policy like the Earned Income Tax
Credit in the U.S. that subsidizes the earnings of low income workers would be useful
both in encouraging employment and in reducing inequality.
6.3.9 Policies directed at pre-school education
There is evidence suggesting that child poverty, and more generally childhood experi-
ences before school, have an e¤ect on the development of children and their education,
and consequently on their subsequent labor market outcomes (e.g. Duncan et al, 1998).
Especially in the case of immigrant families, preschool experiences of children may be
quite important. The other reason for this is the importance of language skills in the
labor market (see Bleakley and Chin, 2000). This suggests that policies directed at pre-
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on the e¤ect of family resources on student performance, Nechyba et al. (1999) conclude
that family resources are likely to have only a limited e¤ect on outcomes in later child-
hood or adolescence. They note, however, that the e¤ect of such resources may be much
larger when family income is below a certain threshold. This suggests that although some
pre-school policies directed at very poor families will be useful, there may not be a need
for a broad range of pre-school policies.
Another problem with policies directed at pre-school is that they have to be catered
not to be too intrusive with the way that families want to bring up their children. An ideal
compromise may be highly subsidized, or even free, day-care for families below a certain
income threshold. Such a policy would also complement the work-…rst policies discussed
previously, since an important barrier to the entry of many women into the labor market
is costs of child care.
Here again the timing of human capital investments becomes important. Now the
contrast is between very early investments, before a child reaches school-age, and invest-
ments during secondary school. Once again, a combination of investments at di¤erent
times as likely to be optimal. Moreover, lack of investment at the very early stage is
likely to create high costs for investments at later stages (Nechyba, et al. 2000). This
consideration reiterates the importance of policies directed at preschool education.
6.4 Concluding Comments
This part of the report discussed various policies that could be useful in reducing inequal-
ity. I tried to highlight both the e¢ciency implications of these policies and their e¤ect
on the distribution of income. The overall conclusions I reached can be summarized as
follows:
1. Although many economists fear the disincentive and disemployment e¤ects of wage
compression policies these e¤ects may have been exaggerated. This suggests that
101wage compression policies, in great moderation, may be a useful tool to reduce
inequality. Since the minimum wage is already relatively high in New Zealand, a
further increase may be unnecessary. In this case, the analysis here suggests that
existing policies that encourage wage compression, such as minimum wages, should
not be dismantled.
2. Similarly, the disincentive e¤ects of redistributive taxation may have also been ex-
aggerated. Redistributive taxation could be an e¤ective policy to reduce post-tax
income inequality, again as long as it is used in great moderation. The possibility
of high earners to migrate to Australia in response to high taxes may make redis-
tributive taxation more distortionary and less useful in the context of New Zealand.
This suggests that a careful study of the tax elasticity of outmigration from New
Zealand is necessary.
3. Perhaps the most e¤ective tool in the arsenal of governments to reduce income in-
equality is human capital policies. There are many reasons to suspect that there
may be underinvestment in human capital, so some amount of subsidies are nec-
essary. Governments already subsidize all three levels of education. It is not clear
whether further direct subsidies are unnecessary.
4. Although many economists and commentators advocate further direct subsidies to
college education, such policies may not be the best option for policymakers. These
policies are often regressive, as they bene…t mostly middle and higher income fam-
ilies. If the concern is to alleviate credit market problems, education loans may
be a better policy tool. To increase college attendance by lower-income families,
on the other hand, the best policy would be need-based or means-tested subsidies
or scholarships. Such policies would be cheaper and more e¤ective in encouraging
college education among lower-income families.
5. However, encouraging college education is unlikely to narrow the gap between the
102top and the bottom of the income distribution. To do this, we need policies that
encourage higher quality secondary education for lower-income families and policies
that encourage training.
6. Although they are unlikely to be highly e¤ective by themselves, work-…rst type poli-
cies that encourage individuals that would otherwise be out of the labor force to
obtain employment, and policies that support pre-school human capital accumula-
tion for children from lower-income families could also be useful.
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1940 0.004 0.21 0.016 0.31 0.035 0.38 0.140 0.37 0.303 .055 0.392 0.63
1950 0.006 0.24 0.011 0.28 0.030 0.37 0.146 0.38 0.219 0.47 0.313 0.56
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1970 0.017 0.32 0.069 0.47 0.179 0.61 0.199 0.45 0.485 0.70 0.652 0.81
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1990 0.090 0.50 0.470 0.81 1.777 1.18 0.357 0.60 1.064 1.03 1.673 1.29
Note: The …rst panel of this table gives the ratio of the employment of skilled relative to
unskilled, and the wage bill of skilled to unskilled workers for the corresponding skill categories.
These data are taken from Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998). Some college refers to those with
more than a high school (hence the measure is those with more than high school divided by
those with high school or less). College graduate refers to all of those with a college degree, and
college equivalent is de…ned as in Autor et al. It is those with a college degree+ 0.5 £those with
some college (correspondingly, the unskilled are de…ned as those with high school and less +0.5
£those with some college). The bottom panel gives the implied technology shifts using equation




123Table 2: Evidence on Selection and Signaling E¤ects From the U.S. Labor
Market
Born in 19- 06-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55
Year#¡ !
Panel A
1950 1.448 1.370 1.175 1.093
1960 1.551 1.564 1.525 1.421 1.303 1.132
1970 1.680 1.656 1.613 1.539 1.392 1.153
1980 1.567 1.560 1.538 1.402 1.222 1.063
1990 1.798 1.761 1.723 1.674
Panel B
¢ln!50¡60 0.103 0.194 0.350 0.328
¢ln!60¡70 0.155 0.234 0.311 0.407
¢ln!70¡80 -0.047 0.021 0.146 0.249
¢ln!80¡90 0.260 0.359 0.500 0.611
Panel C
¢2 ln!50¡70 0.051 0.040 -0.040 0.079
¢2 ln!60¡80 -0.201 -0.213 -0.165 -0.158
¢2 ln!70¡90 0.307 0.338 0.354 0.362
Note: The top panel of this table gives the college premium from the Census indicated at
the beginning of the row for cohorts born in the …ve year intervals indicated at the head of
the column. For example, the …rst number is for individuals born between 1906-10 from the
Census of 1950. The college premium is de…ned as the wages of workers from that cohort with
a college degree or more divided by the wages of workers from that cohort with twelve years of
schooling (high school degree). The bottom panel gives the change in the college premium for
a given cohort between the two indicated dates and the di¤erence between the wage growth of
two neighboring cohorts as indicated by equations (11) and (12). All data are from the public
use microsamples of the decennial censuses for white males born in the U.S..
124Table 3: Changes in Inequality by Cohort From the U.S. (from Juhn et al,
1993)
Panel A: 90-10 Di¤erentials for Log Weekly Wages
Year of market entry 1964 1970 1976 1982 1988
1983-88 1.38
1977-82 1.27 1.38
1971-76 1.13 1.24 1.38
1965-70 1.08 1.12 1.29 1.42
1959-64 1.13 1.01 1.13 1.30 1.40
1953-58 1.02 1.07 1.16 1.32 1.43
1947-52 1.02 1.11 1.15 1.30
1941-46 1.02 1.07 1.16
1935-40 1.06 1.09
1929-34 1.09
Panel B: 90-10 Di¤erentials for Log Wage Residuals
Year of market entry 1964 1970 1976 1982 1988
1983-88 1.09
1977-82 1.06 1.16
1971-76 .96 1.09 1.18
1965-70 .86 .96 1.12 1.23
1959-64 .92 .86 .98 1.12 1.21
1953-58 .88 .91 .99 1.15 1.26
1947-52 .89 .94 .99 1.14
1941-46 .94 .94 1.05
1935-40 .95 .98
1929-34 .99
Note: This table replicates Table 3 of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993). The top panel reports
the 90-10 di¤erential for log weekly wages of the cohorts that have entered the labor market in
the corresponding six year interval. Panel B gives the 90-10 di¤erential for the residuals from
a regression of log weekly wages on education controls. All data are from the March CPSs (see
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Figure 2: The behavior of the (log) college premium and relative supply of college skills
(weeks worked by college equivalents divided by weeks worked of noncollege equivalents)










Figure 3: The dynamics of the relative wage of skilled workers in response to an







Figure 4: Selection into di¤erent education levels on the basis of ability.
129Residual inequality measures for white males 1963-1997
year
 90-50 residual differences  50-10 residual differences
 0.5 times 90-10 residual diffs







Figure 5: 90-50, 50-10 and 0.5£90-10 di¤erentials from log weekly wage regressions for
white males aged 18-65.
130Figure 6: The evolution of the percentage of employment in the top and bottom 25
















∆(τ) = f(τ) − w(τ)
c(τ)
τf τw
Figure 8: Training incentives in non-competitive labor markets.
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